A Saharan issue also shaped far from Rabat
Progress on Western Sahara is never made through statements alone. The balance of power is also built in distant capitals, at the Security Council and in South-South forums, where a vote, a position or even a subtle shift can weigh on an already tight timetable. In 2026, this matters more than ever for Morocco, whose diplomacy is seeking to consolidate autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the basis for a settlement.
The context is clear. Western Sahara remains on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, a legacy of unfinished decolonisation after Spain’s departure in 1976. In New York, MINURSO, the UN mission responsible for the issue, was extended until 31 October 2026 by resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025. In other words, the debate continues, but under the constraints of a timetable and multilateral diplomacy.
Bogota, a more political player than it may appear
In this landscape, Colombia matters more than many might think. The country sits on the Security Council for the 2026-2027 term, having officially begun its mandate on 1 January 2026. It therefore has a voice in any discussion of MINURSO and, more broadly, in the language the Council uses on Western Sahara. For Rabat, this kind of presence is never incidental.
Colombia is not mechanically aligned with any bloc. Its own signals remain mixed. On the one hand, its diplomacy issued messages in February and then April 2026 on cooperation with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic on academic matters, human rights and multilateralism. On the other, Bogota has also made the defence of state sovereignty a central feature of its foreign-policy discourse. This ambivalence explains why every shift in Colombia’s position attracts as much attention in Rabat as in Algiers.
The turning point is therefore not only bilateral. It concerns how Latin America now views African issues. In March 2026, Bogota hosted the first CELAC-Africa high-level forum, evidence that links between the two regions are strengthening in multilateral settings. For Morocco, this is an opportunity. For Polisario’s supporters, it is also a less predictable arena for mobilisation than it was a few years ago.
What the new diplomatic phase changes
For Rabat, the crux of the matter is consolidating an international narrative. Since 2024 and 2025, several Western capitals have taken a further step by backing Morocco’s autonomy plan as a serious, credible or realistic basis for a settlement, without this legally resolving the territory’s status. France reaffirmed in 2026 that “the present and future” of the Sahara lie within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty, while Germany and Canada have also confirmed their support for autonomy. This accumulation matters, because it turns an issue long at a standstill into an active diplomatic phase.
But the concrete effect under international law remains limited. No bilateral recognition, political declaration or administrative map can by itself change the territory’s status under the UN. Western Sahara remains listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and the Security Council continues to seek a “mutually acceptable” political solution. This is where the challenge for Morocco lies: turning scattered diplomatic support into a clearer momentum at the UN, without appearing to impose a fait accompli.
For the population, the implications are different. In the Southern Provinces, the issue is not merely symbolic. It affects investment, trade, ports, jobs and the international visibility of projects already under way by the Moroccan state. At the regional level, every foreign position can also affect relations between Rabat and its neighbours, foremost among them Algeria, Polisario’s main supporter. The Saharan issue thus remains a barometer of shifts in North Africa.
A continental dimension to watch until the next vote
The coming phase must be viewed on an African and transatlantic scale. The Western Sahara conflict is not limited to a Morocco-Polisario standoff. It shapes relations between the African Union, North African states, several West African countries and, now, Latin American partners seeking to exert influence in multilateral forums. Recent developments in Mali, Germany, Sweden, Canada and France show that the issue continues to evolve in fits and starts, in line with geopolitical interests and changes of government.
The next significant date is already known: 31 October 2026, when MINURSO will once again come before the Security Council for review. Until then, every diplomatic visit, statement and adjustment of position will count. Morocco’s aim is to secure broader international support for autonomy. For the Sahrawi camp, the challenge is to preserve the idea of a solution that is not reduced to a simple recognition of sovereignty. Between the two, the UN remains the only arbiter still able to manage the long-term course of the issue.



