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Ghana’s gold purchases boost reserves but raise public costs

Ghana has increased its reserves through gold bought from artisanal miners. But the IMF warns of high costs and the risk of blurring the line between monetary policy and public spending.

Summit table in Accra with documents, headphones and glasses of water in an institutional negotiating room.

A useful strategy, but a bill that is changing in nature

In Accra, the question is no longer only how Ghana replenished its reserves. It is also at what price, and above all what kind of public responsibility is involved. The country has made gold a tool for rapid stabilisation. This has helped the cedi, but it has also shifted the debate towards cost transparency and the precise role of the Bank of Ghana in the gold supply chain.

The issue is sensitive because it touches on three balances at once: monetary stability, state financing and the weight of an artisanal sector that matters to Ghana’s economy but often remains informal. In a country where gold accounts for a large share of exports, how the metal is bought, assayed and resold matters almost as much as the metal itself.

Ghana’s framework: reserves, the cedi and formalising the sector

Ghana is emerging from a period of severe financial strain, under the International Monetary Fund’s programme. In this context, the Bank of Ghana used the so-called “Gold-for-Reserves” programme to buy gold in local currency and then use it to bolster international reserves. The principle is simple: turn a national resource into a foreign-exchange buffer without immediately drawing on the country’s foreign currency reserves.

This approach is part of a broader sequence of reforms. In 2025, Parliament passed the Ghana Gold Board Act, making the Ghana Gold Board, or GoldBod, the sole buyer, assayer, seller and exporter of gold from licensed artisanal mining. The act was promulgated on 2 April 2025, and the new framework took effect in the spring. In other words, the state sought to take control of part of the gold supply chain that it considered too fragmented.

This shift also has a regional dimension. Across West Africa, several central banks are now viewing gold as a strategic reserve asset. Ghana is not alone in this direction, but it has taken the lead by institutionalising a mechanism that directly links artisanal production, foreign-exchange reserves and monetary policy.

What the IMF is really saying

In its December 2025 review, the IMF does not dispute the macroeconomic results. On the contrary, it notes that the programme helped to strengthen the country’s reserve stock. But it warns that the activity creates risks for the Bank of Ghana’s financial sustainability and operational autonomy. The Fund explicitly describes it as a “quasi-fiscal” activity.

The central issue is transaction costs. Buying gold is not cost-free: it has to be weighed, assayed, refined and transported, and intermediaries have to be paid. In its December 2025 report, the IMF says losses linked to ASM transactions under the Gold-for-Reserves programme reached $214 million by the end of September 2025. The same report says the Bank of Ghana had bought $7.6 billion worth of gold through the scheme in 2025 up to August, including $5 billion from artisanal miners between April and August.

Other indicators nevertheless remain favourable. The Bank of Ghana says gross international reserves reached $13.83 billion at the end of December 2025, up from $9.11 billion a year earlier, equivalent to 5.7 months of import cover. The same source reports that inflation fell to 5.4% in December 2025, from 23.8% in December 2024. These figures explain why the debate is less about the scheme’s overall effectiveness than about its governance.

The IMF also notes that GoldBod adds a new layer of operational and fiscal risk. Its June 2025 report had already noted that GoldBod received an endowment of $279 million and aimed to operate at a rate of three tonnes of gold a week. The Fund then estimated that the new structure could increase the state’s exposure if audit, oversight and separation-of-responsibilities rules remained weak.

What changes when the cost is shifted to the state budget

Since July 2025, funding for the scheme has no longer been treated as an internal central-bank operation, but has been borne by the state through GoldBod. In its revised budget, the organisation received 5 billion cedis, or about $427 million, to support gold purchases linked to the artisanal sector. Politically, this is no small change: the spending is now visible to Parliament and taxpayers.

GoldBod, for its part, argues the opposite. The organisation says its model formalises the gold trade, reduces the leakage of metal into parallel channels and increases foreign-exchange earnings. Its own communications say it exported more than 41.5 tonnes of artisanal gold between February and May 2025, worth close to $4 billion. This narrative appeals to the government because it directly links artisanal gold to macroeconomic stabilisation.

For artisanal miners, the stakes are twofold. On the one hand, the official framework could open up a clearer and better-paid market. On the other, it concentrates purchasing and export power in few hands, which could squeeze small operators’ margins if procedures are cumbersome or payments are delayed. For the Bank of Ghana, the benefit is clear: it strengthens its reserves. But in return, it accepts closer involvement in commercial activity that central banks are specifically meant to avoid.

A signal for West Africa and beyond

The Ghanaian case extends beyond Accra. It is part of a broader trend in which several African central banks are using gold from their own soil to strengthen their balance sheets and better absorb external shocks. The World Gold Council notes that central-bank demand is expected to increase, and says domestic gold purchases are becoming an increasingly studied reserve-management tool.

But Ghana’s case also shows how fine the line is. When a central bank becomes the dominant buyer of artisanal gold, it can quickly achieve visible results for reserves and the currency. At the same time, it immediately raises questions about governance, cost and budgetary responsibility. That is where the next phase will be decided: in Ghana’s ability to preserve the scheme’s benefits without blurring the line between monetary policy, mining policy and public spending.

For West Africa, the episode is instructive. ECOWAS does not decide on these mechanisms, but its member states face the same constraints: currency volatility, the need for reserves, the importance of gold and pressure on public finances. Ghana is serving as a test case. The next step will be to see whether GoldBod and the Bank of Ghana can document their costs, stabilise the purchasing chain and prevent the pursuit of foreign exchange from ultimately weakening the institution meant to protect it.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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