First, the classification, because it defines what is at stake. The European Critical Raw Materials Act ranks battery-grade manganese among 17 strategic raw materials, out of 34 critical raw materials. According to the data used in the EU’s 2023 assessment, at the extraction stage the Union depends on South Africa for 41% of its manganese supply and on Gabon for 39%.
Yet one of these two suppliers has just seen the value of its asset plummet.
When a strategic asset ceases to be one
On 1 July 2026, Transalloys, the last manganese smelter still operating in South Africa, shut down its furnaces. The site suspended ferroalloy production with no timetable for resumption, putting about 600 direct jobs and the incomes of some 7,000 people indirectly dependent on the site at risk. This is not an isolated case: more than a dozen South African smelters have closed in recent years because of electricity prices. Its chief executive, Konstantin Sadovnik, explained that the plant had been losing money for more than three years, with energy accounting for nearly 40% of its costs.
The paradox deserves to be measured. South Africa accounted for 36% of global mined manganese production in 2022 and holds nearly 38% of known reserves, with Gabon in second place at 23% of production. The country with the world’s largest reserves no longer has any operational capacity to convert them into alloy. Its asset remains in the ground and in the statistics; it has ceased to be an industrial asset.
The tariff that decides everything
What happened there was not a matter of political will, but of cents per kilowatt-hour. In January 2026, the state-owned electricity utility introduced a special tariff for ferrochrome smelters, before a further cut was negotiated. In April, Eskom chief executive Dan Marokane recalled that a temporary tariff intervention of 87.74 cents per kilowatt-hour had been introduced in January for 12 months, before an agreement on a tariff of 62 cents, subject to conditions.
This preferential tariff was reserved for ferrochrome smelters in exchange for their suspending retrenchment procedures. Manganese and silicon producers, meanwhile, were left out of the scheme: Transalloys continued to pay an effective tariff of about 1.35 rand per kilowatt-hour, more than twice the rate granted to ferrochrome. In the same country, facing processes that are just as energy-intensive, one industry received a public tariff decision and the other did not.
Processing locally cannot be decreed
Guinea: the obligation without the outcome. The country is home to more than a quarter of the world’s bauxite reserves, and its mining code has required local processing since 2011, with the obligation set out in mining agreements. In May 2025, General Amara Camara, minister and secretary-general of the presidency, summed up the record of one of the groups concerned: “GAC, in accordance with its basic agreement, was supposed to build a refinery here in Guinea. Twenty years later, there is nothing. Nothing at all.” Conakry subsequently revoked GAC’s permit in August 2025, before an amicable agreement was reached with EGA in May 2026. The contractual obligation alone did not produce a plant.
Indonesia: success and its price tag. It is the case most often cited as a model, and the most misunderstood. The ban on nickel ore exports did attract substantial smelting capacity. But a World Bank study published in November 2025 measures the hidden cost: the domestic value-added ratio in exports from iron- and steel-using industries rose by 5.6% between 2011 and 2020, while the arrival of smaller, less efficient firms lowered aggregate downstream efficiency, with heavy reliance on imported steel continuing.
Guinea shows that an obligation to process is not enough; Indonesia shows that an export ban can indeed attract industrial capacity, but with more mixed results than may appear. In both cases, rules are no substitute for infrastructure, skills or competitive energy.
Industrialisation in Gabon, subject to conditions
The protocol signed by the Gabonese state and Eramet sets a target of processing up to 700,000 tonnes of ore a year by the end of 2031 and puts three industrial scenarios at different stages of maturity under consideration: a chemical unit to process manganese oxide near Libreville, which could come on stream in late 2028; the refurbishment of the Moanda Metallurgical Complex, with a possible restart in late 2029; and an alloys plant in the coastal zone, which could start up in 2031 and is conditional, in particular, on securing energy and logistics, a separate investment agreement and a final investment decision. Gabon has 886 megawatts of installed capacity, with effective availability far lower, and is targeting 1,100 megawatts by 2030 under its national energy pact (World Bank).
The stakes are clear from the latest trade data. According to Gabonese customs data for 2024 cited by the World Bank, oil, manganese and timber account for 97% of the country’s exports; manganese alone makes up 20.6%. China takes 31.2% of all Gabonese exports, and a slowdown in its demand led Comilog to suspend production for three weeks in 2024. The question is therefore not simply how value is shared between the state and the operator. It is also about reducing a double vulnerability: an economy concentrated on three products and an industry dependent on a small number of markets. Local processing will reduce this exposure only if future plants have access to competitive energy, reliable logistics and sufficiently diversified customers.
The real question
Public debate on these cases almost always focuses on how profits are divided. Past examples show that the decisive question lies elsewhere: who pays for the electricity, and who bears the industrial risk when metal prices fall? South Africa has just answered by default, allowing the last furnace to go cold in a country that holds more than a third of known global reserves.
This is the scenario the Gabonese protocol seeks to avoid, by making the economic viability of projects a prerequisite and, for the future alloys plant, explicitly conditioning it on securing energy. The test will come at each milestone. But for Europe, which has put this metal on its strategic list while having only very limited purification capacity to the standards required for batteries, the stakes are simple: a strategic asset for which nobody finances the electricity is just a deposit.



