Trade can bypass maps, but not the law
On paper, a shipment of phosphate seems simple to classify. In reality, it can reopen a broader political question: the status of Western Sahara and its resources. That is exactly what the US customs decisions of summer 2026 bring to mind: they refer to Morocco without specifying how products from the disputed territory will be treated. In North Africa, where trade borders and political borders do not always coincide, this silence matters as much as the measure itself.
The issue sits within a framework already well established by the United Nations. Western Sahara has been on the list of non-self-governing territories since 1963, and the UN says such a territory is one whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. The UN text does not settle the sovereignty dispute, but it establishes one essential point: the territory’s resources and institutions cannot be treated like those of an ordinary state without taking account of the right to self-determination.
Washington eases duties on fertilisers, then raises some import tariffs
On 29 June 2026, the White House announced an emergency proclamation authorising the suspension, for a maximum of eight months, of certain anti-dumping and countervailing duties on phosphate fertilisers imported from the Kingdom of Morocco. The stated rationale is agricultural and strategic: to secure supplies for US farmers and avoid pressure on food production. A few weeks later, on 23 July, the US Trade Representative announced a new tariff action targeting 60 economies, with a rate of 12.5% for countries deemed insufficiently strict in prohibiting goods produced using forced labour. Phosphate fertilisers are, however, among the categories excluded from this surcharge.
The delicate point lies elsewhere. In the public texts reviewed, there is no clear indication of how US customs should treat products originating in Western Sahara. Morocco is mentioned, but the territory is not. Yet the US Census Bureau does distinguish Morocco from Western Sahara in the designations used for customs statistics in its foreign trade classification. This administrative distinction does not erase the political debate, but it shows that Washington is technically able to distinguish between the two origins.
US ambiguity contrasts with European case law
This grey area contrasts with the position set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union. On 4 October 2024, in the Confédération paysanne case, the Court ruled that melons and tomatoes harvested in Western Sahara must be labelled as originating in Western Sahara, not Morocco. On the same day, in another case, it also reiterated that trade agreements cannot apply to the territory without respecting its distinct status and the principle of consent of the people concerned. In short, the EU has adopted a strict territorial interpretation, while US texts remain silent.
This contrast matters to Rabat. Morocco has for several years sought to consolidate the added value generated by the phosphate sector, including in its southern regions, where OCP highlights industrial investment, desalination projects and the Phosboucraa Foundation. The company presents these programmes as drivers of local development in the Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra and Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab regions. This economic perspective is consistent with Morocco’s national strategy, but it does not resolve the legal dispute over the territory’s status.
A phosphate-rich territory, but still a disputed issue
Figures cited by Western Sahara Resource Watch show that the issue is not theoretical. According to the organisation, 36 ships left El Aaiún in 2025 carrying about 2.02 million tonnes of phosphate, worth an estimated $376.5m. It also says that none of this revenue goes to the representative institutions of the Sahrawi people. The organisation takes an activist approach, but its data are useful for gauging the scale of the flows and the central role of El Aaiún port in the supply chain.
The same issue has already given rise to legal disputes. In South Africa, the seizure of a ship carrying phosphate from Bou Craa led the High Court to examine ownership of the cargo, at the request of the Polisario Front. The South African court found that OCP and its subsidiary Phosphates de Boucraa were not entitled to sell the goods under those circumstances. This precedent is a reminder that once a shipment leaves port, the question is not merely commercial: it also concerns the legitimacy of the chain of ownership.
For the United States, the stakes are concrete. If fertilisers processed from Bou Craa phosphate were to reach the US market, the real question would not only be the applicable duty rate. It would be which origin customs authorities recognise: Morocco, as the 29 June proclamation assumes, or Western Sahara, a distinct territory in US classifications. Until such guidance is published, the ambiguity favours the exporter and leaves the legal challenge unresolved.
What the issue says about this moment in Africa
Ultimately, the issue goes beyond the phosphate trade alone. It shows how North Africa remains shaped by tensions between economic integration, contested sovereignty and external arbitration. For Morocco, exports and industrial projects in the southern provinces support a vision of territorial continuity. For the Sahrawi side, the issue remains consent over resources. For foreign partners, the risk is practical: continuing to trade without clarifying the true origin of goods exposes them to legal disputes, particularly when other jurisdictions, such as the European Union, have already set clearer requirements.
What happens next will be determined by customs practice, not diplomatic language. If the United States publishes guidance on the origin of products from Western Sahara, it will have to choose between administrative convenience and legal consistency. For now, the issue remains open. And it is often in this kind of regulatory silence that lasting power dynamics are decided.



