Darfur case closed, but legal dispute remains
In Khartoum, war has once again placed Darfur at the centre of Sudanese political life. But in The Hague, another battle has been under way for years: one involving evidence, the passage of time and criminal responsibility for attacks on civilians and African peacekeepers. In a landscape already saturated with violence, the decision to end proceedings against Abdallah Banda is a reminder of an uncomfortable reality: under international law, a case can be closed before judgment without the facts disappearing.
Sudan has remained under the scrutiny of the International Criminal Court since the United Nations Security Council referred the Darfur situation to it in 2005, under Resolution 1593. The referral opened a series of prosecutions linked to crimes committed in western Sudan, during a conflict in which the African Union had deployed its Mission in Sudan, known as AMIS, before the transition to the hybrid UN-AU operation.
What the Court decided, and why
On 23 July 2026, ICC Trial Chamber IV terminated proceedings against Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and lifted the arrest warrant for the former Darfuri rebel leader. The decision followed a request from the Office of the Prosecutor, which concluded that the evidence had deteriorated too much over time to support a trial effectively. The Court also said that continuing the case in those circumstances would have compromised the requirement for a fair and effective trial.
Abdallah Banda was charged with three alleged war crimes in connection with the attack on Haskanita, in North Darfur, on 29 September 2007. According to the ICC and UN documents, the attack on an AMIS site killed 12 African peacekeepers and injured at least 8. Judges confirmed the charges in 2011, then issued an arrest warrant in 2014 to secure his presence at trial.
The sensitive issue is the passage of time in the judicial process. The case spanned more than a decade of postponements, logistical difficulties, disputes over the accused’s presence and exchanges about the reliability of witnesses. As early as 2014, the trial date had been left vacant. In 2015, the arrest warrant remained pending. The 2026 decision therefore does not revisit the facts of the attack; it chiefly finds that, at trial stage, the prosecution no longer considers it possible to secure a conviction on sufficiently robust grounds.
Victims, memory and the cost of waiting
Between 103 and 105 victims have been identified in the case, according to judicial and media sources, from Botswana, Gambia, Mali, Senegal and Sudan. They are relatives of those killed or witnesses to the attack. Their presence says something essential: the Haskanita episode did not affect Darfur alone. It touched families and African countries that contributed troops to regional peacekeeping.
For these victims, the closure of the case is anything but abstract. It prolongs an already lengthy wait and fuels a recurring frustration in international courts: when evidence deteriorates, it is often the survivors’ memories that bear most of the burden. In its decision, the ICC said it could not compel the prosecutor to continue the case. The victims’ representatives, meanwhile, regretted that a case opened in the early 2010s had ended without a hearing on the merits.
This also matters for Sudan today. Since 2023, the country has once again been engulfed in war, which has worsened violence in Darfur and around El Fasher, while the UN has described the situation in the west of the country as “catastrophic”. In this context, every case closed without a public verdict fuels a dual sense of injustice: that justice is too slow, and that impunity survives changes in command, alliances of convenience and military reshuffles.
What the case says about Sudan and the continent
The Banda case illustrates a lasting tension in international justice mechanisms applied to Sudan. On the one hand, the legal framework exists: a Security Council resolution, the ICC’s jurisdiction and the expectation that states will co-operate. On the other, the political environment remains fragmented, with multiple armed actors, incomplete archives and often weak co-operation. In a country where the capital, Khartoum, is itself contested by force of arms, maintaining the chain of custody for evidence becomes difficult.
The implications extend across the continent. The case is a reminder that the African Union, its peacekeeping missions and troop-contributing countries are on the front line when African sites are attacked. Haskanita was not a symbolic front: it was an AMIS post, and therefore an African field presence serving regional stabilisation. By closing this case, the ICC has not ended the debate over the protection of African peace operations or how crimes committed against them should be tried.
For now, proceedings against Abdallah Banda have ended, but criminal responsibility in the Darfur case has not been resolved. The Court has noted that the case could be reopened if new evidence emerges. That is an important legal distinction. It means the memory of the crime remains valuable, even as a trial recedes. And in Sudan, where Darfur’s past continues to shed light on the present, that distinction carries great weight.



