A fragile border, a ceasefire under pressure
In northern Ethiopia, a day of fighting is often enough to revive old instincts to flee. When gunfire draws closer to the Sudanese border, residents do not wait for official casualty figures: they cross over, or move to areas considered somewhat safer. This survival mechanism says much about the state of Tigray, an Ethiopian region still scarred by the 2020-2022 war and by a peace deal that halted hostilities without erasing the lines of division.
Tigray cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be seen in the context of northern Ethiopia, where several tensions converge: the dispute over Western Tigray, rivalries with the Amhara regional state, proximity to Sudan, and the fragile implementation of the ceasefire signed in Pretoria on 2 November 2022 under African Union mediation. The AU has maintained its political and military monitoring, notably through its monitoring and verification mission in Tigray, a sign that peace remains incomplete.
What is known about the fighting
Clashes reported in the border area pitted Ethiopian federal forces against fighters linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, according to accusations from both sides. Several local and security sources described fighting that lasted for much of the day, from dawn until late afternoon, near Sudan. Residents on the Sudanese side said they heard explosions and heavy gunfire, while wounded people were reportedly evacuated to al-Hashaba, about 15 kilometres away, in an area already overwhelmed by displacement linked to the previous war. This information remains attributed, as the federal authorities had not publicly responded to the accusations at the time of the events.
The geography of these clashes matters as much as the weapons. Western Tigray remains a contested area, administered since 2020 by actors aligned with the Amhara regional state, with militias present on the ground. It is one of the most sensitive legacies of the war. In 2023, Addis Ababa had promised that a referendum would decide the fate of this fertile territory, which borders Sudan, and enable displaced people to return. But on the ground, the issue remains unresolved, and every clash reignites mistrust between administrations, communities and armed groups.
Tensions have been rising again in northern Ethiopia since January 2026. The UK Foreign Office reported clashes between forces linked to the TPLF and the Ethiopian army, as well as the suspension of civilian flights to Tigray from 29 January 2026. Human Rights Watch has also reported a resurgence of violence and displacement linked to the fighting. In other words, the recent episode did not come out of nowhere: it is part of a gradual revival of friction between the central government and Tigrayan actors.
Why the renewed fighting concerns Addis Ababa, Sudan and the AU
The Ethiopian government faces a twofold challenge. It must prevent another high-intensity war in an already exhausted region, while also ensuring that front lines do not shift towards the Sudanese border. For the Tigrayan authorities and fighters linked to them, the recurring accusation is different: they say they see certain federal manoeuvres as an attempt to politically suffocate Tigray and undermine the ceasefire guarantees. In both cases, the population is the first to pay the price for the uncertainty, as military insecurity blocks returns, freezes the local economy and drives families to seek refuge elsewhere.
Sudan adds another layer of complexity. The neighbouring country has itself been at war since 2023, with logistical and military lines running along the Ethiopian border. In this context, any surge in violence in Tigray could trigger civilian movements towards eastern Sudan, where reception capacity is already under heavy strain. It could also fuel mutual suspicions between Addis Ababa and Port Sudan, with each accusing the other of playing a role in cross-border armed dynamics. The risk is therefore not only local; it is regional.
The African Union, whose headquarters are in Addis Ababa, is watching the issue particularly closely. First, because the ceasefire of 2 November 2022 is one of its main recent diplomatic achievements. Second, because the African monitoring mission in Tigray, partly funded by the Peace Fund, was specifically intended to prevent a resumption of hostilities and support demobilisation. When fighting resumes, the entire narrative of African mediation is put to the test. The stakes therefore go beyond Ethiopia: they affect the credibility of African conflict-prevention mechanisms.
A continental perspective: incomplete peace, threatened regional stability
Tigray remains a barometer for the Horn of Africa. A sustained resumption of fighting could revive military alignments that are already shifting across the region, from Eritrea to Sudan and through Ethiopia’s border areas. It could also undermine efforts to enable displaced people to return and reignite tensions over the sharing of power within the Ethiopian federal state. In a country seeking to stabilise several internal fronts at once, each new flashpoint weighs on the entire political architecture.
At the African level, the episode is a reminder of a simple reality: signing an agreement is not enough to produce peace if territorial, security and administrative questions remain unanswered. Western Tigray, the return of displaced people, disarmament, the chain of command for local forces and the role of interim authorities remain unresolved issues. That is where what happens next will be decided, far more than in declarations of intent alone. It is also where the strength of the compromise reached in Pretoria is measured, day after day.



