In Edaga Hamus, a town in Tigray on the route between the Eritrean border and Mekele, images shared on 7 October 2026 have revived a pressing question: did Eritrean soldiers enter Ethiopia as fighting resumed? Several visual clues and testimonies support this possibility, but the presence and scale of the deployment have not been independently established in every respect.
Fighting resumes as peace remains fragile
Tigray is only just emerging from a devastating war. The Pretoria Agreement, signed on 2 November 2022 by the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), ended the major operations of the 2020-2022 war. It did not, however, resolve all political and territorial tensions.
Fresh clashes broke out on 23 September 2026 between federal forces and an alliance of armed groups that includes the TPLF. The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African regional organisation, have called for de-escalation and reiterated the importance of the Pretoria Agreement. IGAD continues to describe it as the agreed framework for addressing outstanding issues.
Tensions are also rising between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting its adversaries in Tigray; the Eritrean government rejects the allegation. The two countries severed diplomatic relations on 1 October, according to Agence France-Presse. Against this backdrop, Addis Ababa is claiming access to the Red Sea, while Asmara fears that this ambition could threaten its sovereignty.
What the images show — and what they do not prove
Videos and photographs shared on social media show men in uniform and several lorries in Edaga Hamus. Geolocation cited in a fact-checking investigation places the scenes around a recognisable roundabout in the town, more than 50 kilometres from the Eritrean border. Some images also appear to show number plates matching the Eritrean format. These details support the identification of the location and vehicles, but are not sufficient on their own to determine the men’s chain of command or mission.
Witnesses cited by the African Press Agency (APA) have also reported seeing Eritrean soldiers near Idaga Hamus, south of Adigrat. The Associated Press reports, for its part, that a commander allied with the Ethiopian government said Eritrean personnel had entered Adigrat and then Idaga Hamus. The agency says it was unable to verify either account independently. It also cites monitoring group ACLED, which says troops allegedly crossed the border at Zelambessa before being targeted in a drone strike attributed to the Ethiopian army. This last detail is therefore attributed to ACLED, not confirmed by AP.
The distinction matters: the images may provide material clues, while accounts of routes, troop numbers or strikes rely on testimonies and monitoring sources. At this stage, the information reviewed does not establish the exact scale of the Eritrean presence or confirm every step described. Likewise, accusations by both governments must remain attributed: Addis Ababa speaks of support for rebels; Asmara denounces this as a justification put forward by the Ethiopian government.
A precedent that deepens suspicions
Eritrea fought alongside the Ethiopian government during the 2020-2022 Tigray war. Its presence was reported in the region at the time, and parties to the conflict were accused of abuses against civilians. The memory of that period fuels local fears today, but does not allow the current role of the troops seen to be inferred automatically.
The Ethiopian government has called on Eritrean forces it says are present in Tigray to leave the country. Asmara disputes Addis Ababa’s framing. The published images therefore do not settle the wider political dispute; they do, however, lend greater weight to reports of military movements near the border and in northern Tigray.
The consequences extend beyond the Tigray front
For residents, the immediate risk is a further deterioration in security, displacement and trade. Fighting could also disrupt markets and access to services, as a return to normal civilian life remains tied to the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. The consequences will not be uniform: they will depend on the areas affected, which roads remain open and the authorities’ ability to maintain services in towns and rural districts.
For Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders, the stakes are also strategic. The dispute over Ethiopian access to the Red Sea is compounded by the fighting in Tigray and the diplomatic rupture. A direct confrontation between the two states would greatly widen the crisis in the Horn of Africa. Conversely, keeping regional mediation channels open could limit escalation, without resolving the underlying disagreements on its own.
The next step will be to verify whether the reported movements continue and whether the authorities provide evidence that can be independently checked. The African Union and IGAD have a political framework for supporting de-escalation, but the Pretoria Agreement depends first and foremost on decisions by the Ethiopian parties. For now, the images from Edaga Hamus heighten concerns; they do not amount to complete proof of every scenario raised in connection with the conflict.



