In Addis Ababa, the political crisis is no longer limited to tensions between the federal government and Tigray. It is now part of a regional power game in which borders, Red Sea ports, the Nile and armed alliances are intertwined. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Ethiopian President Taye Atske Selassie chose to emphasise this external dimension.
A national crisis becomes regional
On 24 September 2026, the Ethiopian head of state denounced the actions of “reckless and repeat external actors”, accusing them of fuelling instability in the Horn of Africa. In his speech, he did not name Egypt or Eritrea directly. However, his message clearly alluded to persistent tensions between Addis Ababa and its two neighbours.
With Eritrea, disagreements concern in particular the border, access to the Red Sea and each country’s role in regional conflicts. Relations deteriorated sharply after the Tigray war, when Eritrean forces fought alongside the Ethiopian federal army against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF.
With Egypt, the main issue remains the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Addis Ababa presents it as an energy project essential to its industrialisation. Cairo, for its part, fears a reduction in its water resources if the filling and management of the dam are not covered by a binding agreement.
These disputes alone are not enough to explain the violence in Ethiopia. They nevertheless form part of a tense regional environment. The Horn of Africa is also shaped by the war in Sudan, rivalries over ports and competition between Gulf powers, African actors and international partners.
The fragile legacy of the Pretoria agreement
The Tigray war pitted Ethiopian federal forces against fighters linked to the TPLF from November 2020 to November 2022. The agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, halted the fighting and ushered in a period of disarmament, political reintegration and the gradual return of the federal administration.
Three years later, several commitments have been only partially implemented. The return of displaced people, the resolution of disputed territories and the reconstruction of Tigray remain sensitive issues. The presence of foreign forces in some areas and mistrust between the former belligerents also continue to weigh on the process.
In March 2025, an internal split within Tigray’s interim authorities had already rekindled tensions. Officials linked to the TPLF took control of several regional institutions, at the expense of the administration backed by the federal government. The confrontation fuelled fears of a return to open fighting.
The national context remains all the more difficult because the federal authorities are also confronting an insurgency led by Fano forces in the Amhara region. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army and other armed groups continue to put pressure on the state. Ethiopia is therefore facing several centres of violence, with different causes and actors.
An alliance against Abiy Ahmed
On 20 September 2026, seven political and armed groups announced the creation of a coalition called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival. It includes the TPLF, the Amhara Fano movement and the Oromo Liberation Army, as well as organisations based in the Afar, Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions and in the Gumuz area.
The members of the alliance say they want to end the government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and begin an inclusive political transition. TPLF spokesman Michael Asgedom said cooperation could become military if other means failed to achieve this goal.
The coalition nevertheless remains fragile. Its constituent groups champion different political projects. Some demand greater regional autonomy. Others challenge the place of ethnic federalism. Several have clashed in the past and do not have a clearly established common command.
Its announcement nonetheless marks a significant change. Until now, Ethiopian armed opposition groups have operated mainly in their respective strongholds. Their rapprochement gives the opposition a national dimension. It does not yet mean a coordinated offensive is imminent, but it increases the risk of multiple fronts opening up.
Government defends national sovereignty
At the UN, Taye Atske Selassie presented Ethiopia as a country seeking to preserve its sovereignty while pursuing economic transformation. He said his government had shown restraint despite foreign interference and that Addis Ababa wanted to remain a driver of development in Africa.
This view is consistent with Ethiopia’s official position, which regularly accuses neighbouring powers of supporting armed groups or exploiting the country’s internal divisions. Ethiopian authorities have in particular accused Eritrea of maintaining networks hostile to Addis Ababa. Asmara rejects these accusations.
The responsibility of external actors should not, however, obscure the internal causes of the crisis. Competition for federal power, territorial claims, weak judicial mechanisms and tensions between communities directly fuel instability. The closing of political space can also push some opponents towards armed struggle.
For the population, the consequences are tangible. People in rural areas face displacement, movement restrictions and service disruptions. In cities, tensions weigh on prices, investment and commercial activity. Formal businesses are not the only ones affected: small traders and transport operators also depend on safe roads and open markets.
A test for the Horn of Africa
The situation in Ethiopia is of direct concern to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, the regional organisation bringing together several countries in the Horn of Africa. It is also of interest to the African Union, whose headquarters are in Addis Ababa and which supported the process that led to the Pretoria agreement.
The priority will be to establish whether the alliance of seven groups has a lasting structure or remains a temporary declaration. The federal government’s next decisions on the TPLF’s status, the governance of Tigray and negotiations with Amhara forces will be decisive.
The risk extends beyond Ethiopia’s borders. A resumption of war in Tigray could trigger further displacement, disrupt trade in the Horn and complicate relations with Eritrea and Sudan. Conversely, credible political dialogue would give Addis Ababa a chance to turn the Pretoria agreement into a genuine national stabilisation process.



