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Cameroon: Boko Haram relies on local commanders in Far North

In Cameroon’s Far North, Boko Haram is strengthening its networks by giving key roles to local cadres. Looting, kidnappings and extortion remain central to its strategy.

Diplomatic meeting in Yaoundé around a negotiating table with documents, headsets and discreet small flags.

In Cameroon’s Far North, the border has become both a lifeline and a source of danger

At first glance, the violence hitting Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga and Logone-et-Chari looks like a series of scattered incursions. In reality, it reflects a highly localised war economy, fuelled by knowledge of villages, roads, markets and agricultural seasons. In this area of northern Cameroon, groups that emerged from Boko Haram are not seeking only to strike; they also aim to levy, intimidate, recruit and move around.

This shift matters to Yaoundé, but also to the Lake Chad basin as a whole. For more than a decade, Cameroon has faced a cross-border threat that spills beyond its administrative borders and forms part of a shared security space with Nigeria, Chad and Niger. In this setting, military command, monitoring of routes and regional cooperation remain essential, but they are not enough on their own to sever armed groups’ local roots.

Cameroonian commanders serving a war that came from Nigeria

The most striking trend is less visible than the attacks themselves: Cameroonians are rising to command positions within factions such as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, often abbreviated to JAS. According to research by the Institute for Security Studies, this rise through the ranks has accelerated in recent years. The mechanism is simple: those who know the terrain are better at commanding the gathering of supplies, local intelligence and pressure on residents.

In this logic, local leaders become indispensable intermediaries. They know where the military is stationed, which routes bypass checkpoints, which families have some cash and which agricultural seasons may offer crops to loot. An attack is then just one stage in a wider chain: reconnaissance, extortion, abduction, resale, then redistribution of the proceeds to the faction.

Available data also show that the phenomenon is not marginal. In 2025, the Far North recorded the highest number of incidents in the entire Lake Chad basin affected by Boko Haram, ahead of other areas of Nigeria, Chad and Niger, according to research cited by the ISS drawing on ACLED. These groups are now organised around a more local structure, with commanders able to mobilise hundreds of men and coordinate operations across several villages.

Pressure on villages, markets and families

On the ground, residents are paying the price for this adaptation. In Kolofata, Mora, Wulgo, Fotokol, Hile-Alifa and other border communities, looting, cattle theft, abductions and ransoms remain familiar realities. Rural markets, onion fields, secondary roads and fishing areas attract armed groups because they offer quick resources and easy targets. Local criminal gangs sometimes act as intermediaries, further blurring the line between banditry and insurgency.

This pressure affects different groups in different ways. For rural families, it limits access to fields, drives up transport costs and fuels fear of going out at night. For traders, it makes it harder to move goods and undermines businesses already dependent on cross-border movement. For local authorities, it means maintaining a costly security presence across a vast territory that is difficult to control at all times and is marked by porous borders.

The fact that some insurgent leaders come from the region also changes the nature of the risk. Their local roots give them a human advantage that purely military operations struggle to neutralise. They speak local languages, identify escape routes, recognise family ties and know which villages can be paralysed more quickly than others. In this kind of conflict, social knowledge of the territory is almost as valuable as weaponry.

Respond with targeted surrenders rather than relying solely on troop deployments

In response to this reality, one proposal is being repeatedly raised: disarm and secure the surrender of Cameroonian fighters who can be identified within their communities. The idea is not to treat every fighter as an anonymous foot soldier, but to make use of the fact that some kingpins are known in their immediate surroundings. From this perspective, a targeted surrender programme could reduce attacks by depriving the factions of their most useful intermediaries on the Cameroonian side.

Such an option does not replace security pressure. It complements it. The Lake Chad basin remains an area where Boko Haram and its factions move, fragment and adapt. For several years, the United Nations has stressed that the group has changed tactics in response to regional operations, favouring quick strikes, ambushes, abductions and night attacks. The challenge for Cameroon and its neighbours is therefore to combine intelligence, village security, local justice and credible reintegration.

There is also a political dimension. In northern Cameroon, security affects electoral life, access to public services and the state’s ability to remain visible beyond provincial capitals. When a region such as the Far North lives under a chronic threat, every budget decision, every visit by an official and every reinforcement of a security post becomes a signal. The response is therefore not only military; it also concerns local governance and public trust.

A Cameroonian issue, but a test for the entire Lake Chad region

What is unfolding in the Far North goes beyond the national context. The Lake Chad basin remains one of the testing grounds for the fight against mobile armed groups in Africa. By relying on local Cameroonian cadres, Boko Haram shows that an insurgent movement can survive less through territorial conquest than through embedding itself in existing border economies and social networks. This is a lesson for Yaoundé, but also for Abuja, N’Djamena and Niamey.

What happens next will depend on three very concrete factors: the ability of Cameroonian forces to contain incursions, that of the basin’s states to share intelligence more quickly, and that of the authorities to offer credible ways out for local fighters who want to break with the factions. Unless these three levels advance together, armed groups will continue to turn the border into a resource. And the Far North will remain one of the places where the strength of security cooperation in Central Africa and across the Lake Chad basin is tested every day.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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