In Ethiopia, the issue is no longer just a localised confrontation in Tigray. Since 22 September 2026, fighting has also affected Amhara and Afar, two neighbouring regions where political boundaries overlay long-standing rivalries, disputed territories and strategic routes.
This latest upsurge in violence comes less than four years after the Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022 to end the Tigray war. The text halted major military operations, without resolving all territorial questions or restoring lasting trust between Addis Ababa and Tigrayan leaders.
The front widens in northern Ethiopia
Clashes have been reported in Tigray, Amhara and Afar. Human Rights Watch dates the start of this latest phase to 22 September 2026 and describes fighting between the Ethiopian army and forces linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the region’s main political and military movement.
Tigrayan officials have ordered their forces to prepare for “defensive combat”. The federal government, for its part, accuses the TPLF of launching an offensive against army positions in the northern areas. The two sides’ accounts remain conflicting and independent information is limited.
On 24 September, federal authorities said that 272 fighters had been killed in an operation in northern Amhara. They also gave a figure of 260 wounded. This toll comes from the Ethiopian army and has not been independently verified. It should therefore be treated with caution.
Nevertheless, multiple sources report that the fighting has spread to Afar and Amhara. The capture or temporary control of several positions and infrastructure in Tigray has been reported, but the exact extent of territorial gains remains difficult to establish. Communications are disrupted in several areas and journalists’ access remains severely restricted.
A peace agreement that left the most sensitive issues unresolved
The Pretoria Agreement provided for the disarmament of Tigrayan forces, the restoration of federal authority and the return of displaced people. Its implementation, however, has run into several obstacles. The status of territories claimed by both Tigray and Amhara remains particularly explosive.
In western and southern Tigray, areas remain controlled or administered by Amhara forces. For the Tigrayan authorities, their withdrawal is a key condition for normalisation. Amhara officials, meanwhile, regard these territories as subject to a historic and security-related claim. This disagreement fuels tensions over regional boundaries.
Relations between Addis Ababa and the TPLF have also deteriorated since the end of the war. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government is seeking to strengthen federal authority. The TPLF, for its part, is defending broad regional autonomy within the framework of the ethnic federalism enshrined in Ethiopia’s constitution.
This system gives the regions considerable political and cultural autonomy. It has helped manage the country’s diversity, but has also institutionalised competition between regional elites. When political disagreements turn into armed clashes, administrative boundaries quickly become front lines.
An armed coalition challenges the federal government
The crisis worsened after the announcement on 20 September of an alliance bringing together seven armed or opposition organisations. It includes the TPLF, Amhara’s Fano militias, the Oromo Liberation Army and movements from Ogaden, Afar, Benishangul and the Gumuz people.
The groups have said they intend to challenge the federal government and support a transition they describe as more inclusive. Their rapprochement poses a significant political challenge to Addis Ababa. It does not, however, mean that they have a unified command, a common strategy or a coordinated military capacity.
The alliance brings together movements with divergent interests. Some have clashed in the past. Fano militias and Tigrayan forces, in particular, have fought in areas disputed between Amhara and Tigray. The coalition may therefore serve as a means of pressure on the government without forming a unified front.
For the federal government, this convergence could justify a stronger security response. For local populations, above all, it increases the risk of displacement, movement restrictions and disrupted supplies. The effects will vary by area: urban centres may face outages and curfews, while rural areas risk losing access to markets, healthcare and humanitarian aid.
The legacy of the Tigray war still looms
The war fought from 2020 to 2022 had already caused massive destruction and displaced large numbers of people. It had also severely damaged civilian infrastructure in Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The resumption of fighting therefore poses an immediate threat to a social fabric that remains fragile.
Humanitarian organisations are particularly concerned about obstacles to food and medical aid. Displaced people who have not yet returned home could be forced to flee again. Farmers, already exposed to climate hazards and difficulties accessing agricultural inputs, could also lose another growing season.
The situation is also affecting the national economy. Corridors linking the north to major commercial centres are vulnerable to roadblocks and fighting. Transporters are raising their costs, traders are reducing their journeys and the authorities must devote more resources to military operations.
A risk to stability in the Horn of Africa
The Ethiopian crisis extends beyond the country’s borders. Ethiopia occupies a central position in the Horn of Africa and plays a major role in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which brings together several countries in the region. Any new protracted war could affect trade, population movements and security balances with Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti.
It comes amid a regional environment already shaped by the war in Sudan and rivalries over borders, ports and trade routes. The extent to which the conflict may become internationalised cannot yet be assessed, but allegations of external support made by various actors show that the issue has a geopolitical dimension.
The next phase will be decisive. The course of the fighting in border areas, the strength of the alliance between armed groups and the African Union’s ability to bring the parties towards dialogue will need to be watched. Without a settlement on disputed territories, disarmament and power-sharing, the 2022 agreement risks remaining a suspension of hostilities rather than a lasting peace.



