In Antananarivo, closer ties with Moscow are no longer limited to diplomatic statements. In less than a year, military cooperation, political exchanges and Russian influence operations have become part of the transition that began with the fall of Andry Rajoelina. For Madagascar, the stakes go beyond the bilateral relationship: they concern the island’s sovereignty and security, and its place in the Indian Ocean.
A Madagascan transition under intense regional pressure
Colonel Michaël Randrianirina was sworn in as president of the Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar on 17 October 2025, three days after part of the army seized power. The rupture came after several weeks of protests led mainly by young people, initially over water and electricity cuts, and then against Andry Rajoelina’s governance.
The African Union condemned the unconstitutional change of government and called for a return to constitutional order. SADC, the Southern African integration organisation of which Madagascar is a member, also called for inclusive dialogue and an electoral roadmap. The Madagascan transition is therefore taking place within a regional framework in which African organisations are seeking to prevent a political crisis from becoming a new foothold for external security interests.
The context is all the more sensitive because Madagascar was expected to play a prominent role in SADC. Antananarivo hosted several important meetings of the organisation in August 2025, before stepping back from the chairmanship of its Council of Ministers after the change of power. The situation in Madagascar is thus being monitored by the African Union, SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission.
From diplomatic visit to military cooperation
The first public sign of closer ties with Moscow came a few days after Michaël Randrianirina’s inauguration. The Madagascan president received Russia’s ambassador in Antananarivo. Then, in December 2025, a Russian delegation of about 40 people travelled to the Madagascan capital. It was led by General Andrei Averyanov, a senior Russian military intelligence official and a figure associated with Africa Corps.
Africa Corps is the organisation that has gradually taken over some of the functions previously carried out by the Wagner Group in several African countries. In Madagascar, Russian instructors have taken part in training Madagascan military personnel. A training programme was launched around the country’s first airborne battalion, with the participation of personnel linked to Russian military intelligence.
An investigation published on 23 September 2026 by the All Eyes on Wagner collective, affiliated with the INPACT NGO, and reviewed with Russian investigative journalists, also refers to deliveries of military equipment. The researchers mention helicopters, armoured vehicles, trucks, drones and firearms. The exact nature and volume of this equipment have not, however, been publicly established for each delivery. It is therefore important to distinguish documented information from the estimates put forward by the investigators.
General Averyanov subsequently reappeared at high-level meetings. He reportedly hosted Michaël Randrianirina in Moscow in February 2026. There, the Madagascan president met Vladimir Putin and presented cooperation with Russia as potentially covering health, education, energy, hydrocarbons, infrastructure and defence.
Influence also operates through civilian networks
Russia’s strategy does not rely on uniforms alone. The investigation describes the activities of African Initiative, an organisation presented as a communications and influence channel. Its work targets young people, the media and public figures in particular. Sporting activities, competitions and trips to Russia form part of this outreach.
This approach broadens the scope of the partnership. It means Moscow does not appear solely as an arms supplier or security partner. It also seeks to cultivate an image as a power attentive to young people, culture and professional opportunities. In a country where distrust of political elites remains high, this messaging may resonate with some of the population, but it does not prove general support for Russian policy.
Several Madagascan officials are associated with this new relationship. Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko, president of the National Assembly and president of the African Judo Union, has played a public role in presenting military cooperation with Moscow. Prime Minister Mamitiana Rajaonarison is also described as supportive of closer economic and financial ties with Russia. These positions form part of Madagascan diplomacy, which officially claims to remain open to multiple partners.
This openness does not necessarily mean complete alignment. For the transitional authorities, Russia may offer military and political support while their legitimacy remains contested by some African and international actors. For Moscow, the partnership offers a gateway into a region where its influence remains less established than in the Sahel or the Central African Republic.
Diego Suarez, a sensitive point in the Indian Ocean
Madagascar’s geography gives the relationship a strategic dimension. The island lies close to maritime routes linking southern Africa, the Mozambique Channel, the Middle East and Asia. The port of Diego Suarez, in Antsiranana, occupies a particularly important position in the north of the country.
Russian delegations travelled to the area in 2026. Madagascar and Russia have also announced discussions on a joint economic zone, with an initial project linked to fuel storage. These announcements do not prove that a Russian military base is being established. They do, however, show that cooperation now extends beyond training Madagascan forces.
Logistical and energy control is a central concern. Storage, transport or maintenance infrastructure can support commercial activities, but can also facilitate naval or military operations. This is why any project around Diego Suarez should be assessed in the light of Madagascar’s commitments, maritime law and regional transparency mechanisms.
The financial dimension and the limits of the partnership
The investigation also refers to the A7 system, presented as an alternative financial infrastructure intended to facilitate Russian transactions despite Western sanctions. Its precise role in Madagascar remains difficult to establish publicly. No available evidence allows it to be stated that a complete financial system has already been set up on the island.
The issue nevertheless remains important. Parallel payment mechanisms could be used to finance military contracts, security services or economic projects. They could also expose Madagascan banks and businesses to the risk of secondary sanctions and restrictions on access to international markets.
For the population, tangible results will be judged against other criteria: the availability of electricity, access to water, employment, the price of essential goods and security in the regions. A military partnership will not automatically address these urgent needs. It could even divert attention and resources from public services if agreements remain opaque or mainly benefit the ruling circles.
A test for regional sovereignty
Russia is seeking to consolidate its position in Africa after facing difficulties in some parts of the Sahel. Madagascar offers it a different environment: a strategic island, a transitional government seeking support and a maritime frontage looking out on the Indian Ocean.
What happens next will depend on three factors. The first will be the publication of a credible roadmap towards elections. The second will be the transparency of military, port and financial agreements. The third will be the ability of the African Union, SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission to remain at the centre of monitoring the transition.
For Madagascar, the challenge is to diversify its partnerships without replacing one dependency with another. For the region, the task is to prevent political instability from turning a strategic area of the Indian Ocean into a zone of opaque military competition.



