In Gitega, the question is no longer simply how many people Burundi can accommodate. It now concerns the conditions set for a foreign power seeking to transfer people with no direct ties to the country to African soil.
A discreet deal in a wider US campaign
On 27 August 2026, Burundi received 12 nationals of third countries deported from the United States. The people transferred are reportedly from Cameroon, Angola, Mauritania and Sudan. They were therefore not being returned to their countries of origin, but to an African state that had agreed to receive them.
This practice is known as “third-country deportation”. It involves sending a person to a country with which they do not necessarily have family, administrative or historical ties. Washington is now using it as part of a more hardline migration policy.
An investigation by an international media consortium estimates that more than 25,000 people have been transferred to third countries since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025. The count, compiled as of 31 August 2026, is based on documents and data gathered by the investigators. It includes operations involving several dozen countries.
In Africa, reported agreements or arrangements concern Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and South Sudan. The terms are not always public. Any payments, the length of stays and the legal status of those transferred are often difficult to verify.
Évariste Ndayishimiye’s position
Asked about the arrangement, Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye described his country as a welcoming land. He also said the government had asked the United States not to transfer “criminals” to Burundi.
This distinction is central. It suggests that Bujumbura does not want to receive deportees indiscriminately, but only those considered not to pose a danger to the public. The problem, however, lies in the definition of the word “criminal”. A criminal conviction, an accusation, an offence related to residence status or a US administrative decision do not have the same legal effects.
In the information available, the Burundian presidency has not made public the full text of the agreement with Washington. It is therefore impossible to establish with certainty what safeguards are in place for the 12 people transferred, their access to a lawyer, their freedom of movement or the procedure envisaged for their possible return.
This lack of transparency is not limited to Burundi. In several African countries involved in the US programme, governments have confirmed the arrival of deportees without publishing all the clauses negotiated. The US authorities, for their part, cite the need to implement their migration policy and return people who cannot be sent directly to their countries of origin.
A country already committed to hosting refugees
Burundi is no stranger to forced displacement. For several years it has hosted refugees, mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Tens of thousands of people live in the country or have found protection there after fleeing violence in the east of the DRC.
This reality supports the official argument that Burundi has experience of hosting people. But a refugee seeking protection and a person deported by a third country do not fall under the same framework. The former is generally seeking refuge. The latter is sent to a country that is not their own, sometimes without having been able to effectively challenge that destination.
The distinction has implications for Burundian institutions. Security services, the justice system, local authorities and humanitarian organisations need to know who the people transferred are, what their status is and which administration is responsible for their care.
It also affects the population. In the economic capital, Bujumbura, as in Gitega, the impact may remain limited if the group is placed under a strict, temporary regime. In rural areas, where public resources are more constrained, however, the arrival of additional people could create tensions if accompanied by little information or few resources.
The political and diplomatic cost for Gitega
For the Burundian government, the agreement could strengthen ties with Washington at a time when the country is seeking to expand its diplomatic and economic partnerships. Arrangements of this kind may also be linked to financial aid, logistical support or commitments in other sectors.
But the diplomatic gain carries a risk. Burundi could be seen as a transit point used by the United States to remove people whom no other country wants. That perception would be all the stronger if the conditions of detention or stay remained unknown.
The issue also arises in a sensitive domestic context. Since Évariste Ndayishimiye’s election in 2020, the Burundian government has sought to improve relations with several external partners. At the same time, human rights organisations continue to report enforced disappearances, alleged extrajudicial killings and restrictions targeting critical voices.
These allegations alone do not establish how the 12 people transferred will be treated. They do, however, explain why judicial safeguards and independent oversight are especially important. A migration agreement cannot be assessed solely by the number of people received or the aid that may have been secured.
An issue extending beyond Burundi’s borders
Burundi is a member of the East African Community, a regional organisation that also includes Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Somalia. Population movements in the region are linked to conflicts, cross-border trade and political crises. A decision taken in Gitega can therefore affect regional dynamics, even if the people concerned are not Burundian.
The issue is also of interest to the African Union. The continent has long debated free movement, shared responsibility for refugees and respect for fundamental rights. Bilateral agreements with foreign powers bring these principles up against a more pragmatic reality: some governments are seeking resources, diplomatic assurances or security co-operation.
The next challenge will be transparency. The precise status of the 12 people, how long they will remain in Burundi, the oversight mechanisms and the terms of any subsequent transfer will need to be established. It will also be necessary to verify whether the principle set out by Évariste Ndayishimiye — offering refuge, but not to people considered criminals — is written into a specific agreement or is merely a political position.
For Gitega and Washington alike, this case is therefore a test. It measures less Burundi’s material capacity to receive a small group than its ability to set public rules, protect the rights of those transferred and prevent migration co-operation from becoming a diplomatic grey area.



