Wednesday, November 18, 2026

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Senegal: jail term for insulting president revives calls to repeal Article 254

The conviction of three commentators close to Pastef has reignited debate in Dakar over insulting the head of state. Civil society groups and lawyers are calling for the repeal of an article they consider vague and intimidating.

African diplomatic meeting in Dakar, with documents, translation headsets and discreet table flags.

An old offence, a very current debate

In Dakar, the line between political speech and criminal insult remains fragile. That fragility weighs all the more heavily when tensions rise between activists, commentators and institutions, in a Senegal where public debate has become sharply polarised since recent election periods. The issue therefore goes beyond a simple legal case: it raises questions about the place of dissent in a West African democracy often cited for its culture of elections and political negotiation.

It is against this backdrop that the conviction, on Wednesday 5 August, of three commentators close to Pastef has revived an older question: should the offence of insulting the head of state remain in Senegal’s Criminal Code? In practice, the provision continues to fuel fears of criminal punishment for remarks deemed excessive, especially when interpretation rests on vague criteria.

What the law says, and why it divides opinion

The heart of the debate lies in Article 254 of the Criminal Code. Several legal and civil liberties analyses point out that it provides for prison sentences and fines for insulting the president of the Republic, including when another person is exercising the powers of the head of state. The penalties often cited range from six months to two years’ imprisonment, with a fine of between 100,000 and 1,500,000 CFA francs.

For human rights organisations, the problem is not only the severity of the penalty. It also lies in the imprecision of the text. ARTICLE 19 has argued for several years that overly broad criminal laws on insult, defamation or “fake news” encourage self-censorship and give the authorities responsible for enforcing the law too much discretion. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights takes a similar view: its Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa calls for restrictions to be prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued.

This interpretation is not unique to Senegal. At the African level, the Commission has already called on states to repeal criminal defamation and insult laws that restrict freedom of speech. African case law, including cases from other countries on the continent, has also established that a prison sentence for critical remarks raises serious concerns under Article 9 of the African Charter. In other words, the Senegalese debate is part of a broader continental trend: maintaining public order, yes, but without criminalising political criticism to the point of stifling discussion.

A legal case unsettling the ruling camp

The case of 5 August is not isolated. Over the past several months, several Pastef activists or supporters have already been prosecuted or convicted in cases involving insults to the head of state, threats or remarks deemed insulting. In spring 2026, similar rulings targeted figures close to the governing movement, showing that the offence continues to be used against political actors at the highest levels of power as well as more peripheral voices.

For civil society, this point is crucial. The problem is not simply the political affiliation of the defendants. It is that a provision inherited from another era can serve, from one administration to the next, as a tool for disciplining critical voices. Human rights advocates, including Alioune Tine and representatives of ARTICLE 19, are therefore calling for an end to the use of imprisonment. They support alternatives: proportionate fines, community service and civil remedies where appropriate, but no prison for speech that forms part of public debate.

The paradox is clear. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye himself launched a national dialogue in May 2025 focused on reform of the political system, amid what was presented as a more open climate after the severe tensions of 2021 to 2024. At the same time, recurring debates over speech-related offences show that institutional openness has yet to be fully reflected in criminal law. This is where the coherence of Senegal’s current political moment is at stake.

What this case says about Senegal, and beyond

For Senegalese people, the issue is tangible. In urban centres, where political debate moves quickly across television panels, social media and opinion programmes, the risk of legal action fuels self-censorship. In the regions, where information also travels through local and community networks, fear of prosecution can have the same silencing effect. Public debate is impoverished on both sides: among those who speak too freely and those who would rather stop speaking altogether.

The case also touches on the trajectory of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, since the region’s democratic stability depends as much on elections as on the quality of civil liberties. When a West African state retains an offence of insulting the head of state, it sends an ambiguous signal: political speech is tolerated, but only up to a limit set by criminal law. This weighs on the credibility of reforms announced during periods of political change and on trust between those in power, the opposition and civil society.

At the continental level, the Senegalese case resonates as a test of consistency. Senegal is often regarded as a benchmark for electoral competition in West Africa. But a strong democracy is measured not only by the holding of elections. It is also reflected in the state’s ability to withstand criticism without making prison the default response. It is precisely on this front that the case of Article 254 will continue to be watched, with the courts as the first arbiter and political reform as a still-unfinished horizon.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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