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Kenya’s ‘goons’ threaten 2027 presidential race

In Kenya, the rise of ‘goons’ is alarming NGOs and human rights defenders. The groups are accused of intimidating opponents and fuelling political violence ahead of 2027.

In a Nairobi newsroom, Kenyan journalists prepare a segment with a camera, microphones and blurred screens.

A campaign that begins long before the posters go up

In Nairobi, the political battle is fought not only at rallies, in opinion polls or in the courts. It is also fought in the streets, where groups of young men are suspected of being used to disrupt gatherings, intimidate rivals and spread fear. In everyday Kenyan usage, they are called “goons”. The word captures their role: to beat, disperse and deter.

This phenomenon has not emerged from nowhere. It is rooted in Kenya’s long history of electoral violence, local patronage and the use of informal auxiliaries by the powerful. But it is taking on a new scale today, amid social anger, youth mobilisation and a campaign already beginning ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Kenya’s Constitution provides for a general election every five years, on the second Tuesday in August, placing the next national vote in 2027.

Kenya emerges from a turbulent period of protests

The return of “goons” to public debate is linked to the wave of major protests against the high cost of living and police abuses. Human rights organisations have documented deaths, injuries, arbitrary arrests and, in some cases, the presence of armed men or groups likened to gangs alongside security forces during the crackdown on demonstrations. Human Rights Watch has noted, in particular, that witnesses saw men suspected of belonging to gangs taking part in violence against protesters in Nairobi and Kisumu.

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, or KNCHR, has also reported serious violations during demonstrations in 2025 and 2026, including the arrest of protesters and alleged enforced disappearances after the protests of 25 June 2026. These findings have reinforced the view among several NGOs and legal experts that the issue is no longer simply one of poorly managed public order, but of a wider ecosystem of political violence in which the state, partisan actors and local intermediaries can intersect.

The government’s response also shows that the issue has become sensitive at the highest level. In June 2026, Kenya’s presidency announced a compensation scheme for nearly 2,000 victims of abuses linked to the protests, based on a KNCHR report. This gesture does not close the case. On the contrary, it confirms that violence in the streets, police stations and political fringes is now weighing on the national agenda.

Loose networks, useful to politicians, costly for society

The use of “goons” follows a familiar pattern. A local leader, elected official, campaign operative or financial intermediary mobilises unemployed young people, often in deprived urban areas or neighbourhoods marked by high tensions. Their roles vary: disrupting a meeting, blocking access, tearing down banners, frightening voters or even attacking opponents. This is not an army. It is more diffuse, harder to prove and therefore easier to deny publicly.

For citizens, the problem is immediate. In major cities such as Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa, political violence affects not only leaders. It also harms small business owners, transport workers, street vendors, journalists and residents of poorer neighbourhoods, who find themselves on the front line when clashes escalate. Incidents in 2024 and 2025 showed that the economic damage can be heavy, sometimes within just a few hours, with shop windows smashed, stock lost and people forced to flee.

For political leaders, however, these groups offer short-term tactical value. They make it possible to apply pressure without officially taking responsibility. But this calculation undermines the credibility of institutions. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission, or NCIC, recently warned that rising political intolerance, inflammatory rhetoric and verbal violence threaten public peace. It also cautioned that the country is entering a highly sensitive pre-election period.

Some civil society voices go further. The Kenya Human Rights Commission speaks of “political goonism”, a practice it describes as the use of organised gangs with the direct or indirect backing of public or political actors. This view is shared by other organisations, which argue that weak sanctions fuel the phenomenon’s recurrence. As long as those who commission the violence remain beyond reach, the perpetrators take the police’s attention in place of those responsible, while the chain of command remains intact.

A Kenyan warning, and a regional signal

Kenya is not an isolated case in East Africa. Across the East African Community, electoral contests, tensions on the streets and local power struggles remain recurring issues. Nairobi, the region’s political capital and economic hub, is therefore sending a signal that reaches far beyond its borders. When a country regarded as a diplomatic and commercial centre tolerates the entrenchment of partisan violence, confidence in the rules of the game is weakened across the board.

The continental implications are clear. The coming months will show whether Kenya can contain the escalation before the 2027 presidential election or allows an atmosphere to take hold in which the streets become an ordinary instrument of political competition. The issue is not only one of security. It concerns the protection of the right to demonstrate, freedom of expression, the credibility of the IEBC, the electoral body, and the ability of institutions to maintain the line between public order and repression.

If the country succeeds in breaking this cycle before the election, it will offer a useful example to other African democracies facing the same dangers: outsourcing violence, impunity for those who commission it and the normalisation of intimidation. If it fails, the cost will extend beyond the 2027 election. It will weigh on public trust, urban economic activity and the image of a Kenya that, despite its tensions, remains one of East Africa’s major political centres.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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