Tigray still caught between fragile peace and political rearmament
In Addis Ababa, memories of the war in northern Ethiopia have not faded. A protest, a statement or an accusation of forced recruitment is enough to rekindle a simple fear: that Tigray could fall back into a pattern of armed mobilisation while its population is still trying to recover. The region remains a major flashpoint between the federal government, based in Addis Ababa, and Tigrayan leaders, in a country where the end of the war remains incomplete.
The context is all the more sensitive because Tigray remains at the heart of the process launched by the Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022 to silence the guns after the 2020-2022 conflict. Since then, the region has not returned to stable political normality. The TPLF, Tigray’s dominant political force, remains at odds with the federal government, while tensions persist over the return of displaced people, administrative control and local security.
Conflicting accusations over forced recruitment
The latest alarm has a specific starting point. On 6 July 2026, Human Rights Watch said that Tigrayan authorities had been forcibly recruiting civilians since at least April, including children aged 15 in some documented cases. The organisation cites abductions, night-time searches, arrests in the street and at gold mines, and describes a climate of fear in the region. The information was subsequently taken up and relayed by other actors, including Ethiopia’s national news agency and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, which called for the campaign to stop immediately.
In response to the accusations, TPLF supporters deny that there is a strategy of illegal mobilisation. The party rejects the claim that its structures are organising forced conscription. The opposing camp, for its part, emphasises the risk of a new war. On 18 July, at a rally in Meskel Square in Addis Ababa, participants called for an end to abductions and forced recruitment, accusing the Tigrayan leadership of endangering regional peace. Ethiopia’s state news agency described the march as a citizen mobilisation against repression and abductions.
In this climate, former Tigrayan official Getachew Reda, now a federal-level minister and a prominent figure in the faction opposed to the TPLF, denounced on 7 July what he called an inhuman and destructive conscription drive. His intervention shows the extent to which the Tigrayan divide pits not only Addis Ababa against Mekelle, but also rival Tigrayan factions against one another, each seeking to embody peace or political legitimacy. This internal rivalry further weakens the cohesion of a region already battered by war, displacement and economic losses.
What these tensions mean for Ethiopia and the region
For residents, the stakes are concrete. A resumption of hostilities would further close off routes for displaced people to return, make it harder to find work and worsen insecurity in a region where many young people have already experienced war, family separation and hardship. For the federal authorities, the challenge is different: to preserve the sovereignty of the state, contain any armed remobilisation and prevent Tigray from once again becoming a source of instability on the country’s northern border.
However, the issue extends beyond Ethiopia. The country’s north borders Eritrea, and the region is part of an area where balances are already fragile. IGAD, the regional organisation for the Horn of Africa, is closely monitoring the risks of a security spillover. A relapse into conflict in Tigray would affect displacement flows, cross-border trade and Addis Ababa’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre across the region. The precedent of 2020 also shows that a local crisis can quickly take on a regional dimension.
The continental implications are clear. Ethiopia is home to the African Union headquarters, yet it remains exposed to internal tensions that undermine its diplomatic standing. Until the Tigray question is stabilised, every bellicose speech, every accusation of forced recruitment and every counter-accusation will continue to weigh on the credibility of the Pretoria compromise. The coming weeks will show whether the current episode remains a war of words or leads to a new phase of political and security confrontation.



