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Equatorial Guinea labels exiled opposition a terrorist threat, intensifying crackdown

Equatorial Guinea’s justice system has labelled CORED a terrorist group and offered rewards for the return of its exiled leaders, further intensifying political pressure from Malabo.

Facade of a modern government building in Malabo, with several anonymous visitors outside the entrance.

In Malabo, the line between opposition and internal enemy is blurring

In Equatorial Guinea, a single word can change the status of a political group overnight. In Malabo, the justice system has just placed CORED, a coalition of opponents based mainly outside the country, in the category of “terrorist groups” and “criminal organisations”. The decision is not merely a legal one. It also says something about how the authorities treat political exile and organised criticism.

In a country ruled by Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo since 1979, dissent has long been closely monitored. Human rights organisations describe a narrow civic space, with arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention and trials considered unfair. The regional context also matters. Equatorial Guinea is a member of the African Union and CEMAC, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, placing its internal tensions in a neighbourhood where political security and regime stability remain sensitive issues.

What Malabo’s political labelling signals

On Monday 21 September 2026, the Fiscalía General del Estado made public in Malabo resolution number 08/2026, dated 14 September 2026, declaring the Coalition of the Opposition for the Restoration of a Democratic State, known by the acronym CORED, a “terrorist group” and “criminal organisation”. The government’s official website confirmed the announcement the same day.

The authorities say they are targeting a group made up of leaders of parties and associations opposed to the government, most of them in exile in France, Spain and the United Kingdom. According to the same announcement, a financial reward of up to €1.5 million may be offered to any person, institution or government that facilitates the “repatriation” of certain leaders. The name of Salomon Abeso Ndong, presented as the coalition’s leader and based in London, tops the list. The amounts then vary, with rewards ranging from €700,000 to €1 million for 12 other people.

The official account goes further. The prosecutor’s office claims that, after a coup plot failed in 2017, CORED activated a “Plan B” based on contacts with armed groups such as al-Qaeda or Boko Haram, with the aim of targeting the head of state, overthrowing the government and attacking markets, official buildings and embassies. At this stage, this part of the case remains an allegation by the authorities. It should therefore be read as such.

Exile, security and the balance of power

The CORED case is part of a broader pattern. Equatorial Guinea’s authorities regularly associate dissent with destabilisation, or even terrorism. The BTI 2026 report notes that the regime manages internal divisions through repression, co-option and rhetoric that portrays dissident activity as mercenary or terrorist. Human Rights Watch, for its part, points to the persistence of serious abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention and unfair trials.

For opponents in exile, the decision changes the nature of the risk. It does not only target their reputation. It could complicate their travel, make their relationship with host countries more sensitive and increase pressure on family networks back home. For the authorities, the stakes are twofold: to show they remain in control of the security narrative and to deter any reorganisation of the opposition beyond the country’s borders.

The country is also entering a period in which official rhetoric emphasises order, stability and institutional continuity. Yet the underlying issue remains political: how to manage the opposition without criminalising all criticism. In a state where the levers of power have been concentrated for decades, there is a strong temptation to treat opponents as a security threat. But this could further shrink the space for public debate, which is already limited.

A national case, but a regional signal

Equatorial Guinea is not an isolated case. In Central Africa, political transitions are often viewed through the lens of stability, hydrocarbons and border control. In this environment, a terrorism accusation against opponents in exile could influence administrative, police and judicial practices beyond Malabo. It also raises a fundamental question for CEMAC and the African Union: how to defend security without normalising the political labelling of dissent.

The next point to watch will be not so much the declaration itself as what follows: extradition requests, judicial cooperation, diplomatic pressure and possible responses from the European capitals where several of those targeted live. For Malabo, the challenge is to lock down the case. For the opposition, it is to prevent this designation from becoming a lasting instrument of political isolation.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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