A precious metal with fragile traceability
In several African capitals, gold is more than a raw material. It is a source of revenue and a means of financing public services, but also a channel through which income that should go into national budgets is lost. In Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the same conclusion keeps emerging: the wealth is there, but its movement too often escapes state oversight.
The issue goes beyond mining. It affects tax revenues, security in extraction areas, the credibility of customs controls and administrations’ ability to track a mineral that is easy to move, melt down and repackage. In both countries, the question is simple to frame but difficult to resolve: who extracts, who buys, who exports, and who accounts for it?
Cameroon and the DRC belong to two different economic areas, but face a shared challenge. On one side is CEMAC, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, where the formalisation of supply chains remains uneven. On the other is a continental-scale country where mining circuits are fragmented between large companies, artisanal miners and often opaque trading networks. In both cases, weak monitoring of flows creates room for undeclared exports and informal outflows.
What the available data show
In Cameroon, the gaps are striking. Data from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative show that the country declared exports of 22.3 kilos of gold in 2023. At the same time, United Arab Emirates import statistics indicate more than 15 tonnes from Cameroon over the same period. The gap is not marginal. It points to a major failure of traceability, or to exports that do not pass through official channels.
This anomaly is not new. Cameroon’s gold sector is particularly active in the East and Adamawa regions, where artisanal and semi-mechanised mining provides income for many households. But some of this production remains off the public radar. The authorities have announced regulatory measures, but they have yet to convince civil society or specialist analysts that the chain of controls is robust.
In the DRC, the problem is on a different scale. The country produces gold in several provinces, with industrial and artisanal circuits operating side by side. Available public data show that the Congolese subsoil generates significant volumes, but gold accounts for only a marginal share of the country’s mining exports, which are dominated by copper and cobalt. This low statistical visibility of gold leaves room for revenue losses, particularly in areas where tax and customs administrations have little presence.
National transparency bodies have nevertheless stressed for several years the need to document flows more effectively. In the DRC, the national EITI says that mining exports are now published more comprehensively by the mines administration. But the artisanal link remains the most vulnerable: small-scale production, intermediary purchases, cross-border transport, then re-export through regional or extra-regional trading centres.
Why revenue continues to evade the state
The first problem is institutional. In both countries, several agencies are involved in the same supply chain: mines, tax authorities, customs, security services and local authorities. When responsibilities are not clearly coordinated, operators exploit the grey areas. A transaction can then be declared to one agency and remain invisible to another. This is often where revenue is lost.
The second problem is commercial. Artisanal gold moves quickly. It can leave a mining site in raw form, be mixed with other lots, then be exported through a trader, a shell company or an intermediary based in another country. At that point, the lack of traceability makes it almost impossible to reconstruct the full journey. Gaps between declared exports and recorded imports then become an indicator of leakage.
The third problem is political. In sectors where revenues are high and controls weak, the temptation to capture wealth is strong. Private operators seek to cut costs, including tax costs. Public officials may be exposed to corruption. Local communities, meanwhile, rarely see the taxes and royalties they are promised. Yet they bear the effects of extraction: pressure on land, competing land-use claims, insecurity and deteriorating basic services.
In Cameroon, the issue directly affects the East, Adamawa and border areas, where gold can move into neighbouring countries before reaching more distant markets. In the DRC, it concerns mainly the mining provinces in the east and north-east, where porous borders complicate controls. In both cases, collection towns and road corridors play a decisive role. Mining revenue is often lost less at the bottom of the pits than on the roads leading to exit points.
A regional issue, not just a national one
The Cameroonian and Congolese cases should be viewed at a regional level. Gold is not stopped by administrative borders. It follows trade corridors, processing hubs and trading centres in the Gulf, particularly Dubai, often cited in international analyses of African gold flows. When one country falls short on traceability, the entire chain is disrupted.
This reality also concerns cooperation between African states. Tackling illicit outflows does not rely on repression alone. It requires registering sites, identifying buyers, publishing volumes, tracing exports and systematically cross-checking customs data. Without this framework, official declarations remain fragile, even when they exist on paper.
Ultimately, the debate is not about pitting mining against transparency. It is about profitable but poorly controlled supply chains and states still trying to regain control. Cameroon and the DRC illustrate the same challenge in two different ways: producing more is not enough. States must also be able to count, track and bring value back into public coffers.
What happens next will depend on national transparency reports, customs reforms and cooperation with transit and destination countries. This is where it will be decided, in very concrete terms, whether African gold continues to evaporate or finally begins to finance the economies that produce it.



