In Addis Ababa, the federal government promises a more united and influential Ethiopia. But in several regions, the question remains: who decides, on whose behalf, and what place is left for local autonomy?
This tension has run through Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s political project since he came to power in 2018. It helps explain why the end of the war in Tigray was not enough to stabilise the country.
A federal state shaped by two competing visions
Ethiopia organises part of its federal system around peoples and languages. The system recognises regional identities and grants them powers. Its defenders see it as a response to a long history of centralisation. Its critics argue that it has also institutionalised rivalries between groups and territories.
Abiy Ahmed took the helm of government in 2018 promising reforms and renewed national cohesion. In 2019, he launched the Prosperity Party, conceived as a national party rather than a coalition of regional parties. The change has prompted two opposing interpretations: supporters say it should overcome divisions; opponents argue that it concentrates more power in Addis Ababa.
This opposition is not merely a theoretical debate. It concerns the distribution of resources, political representation, security and the ability of regions to govern. Research on Ethiopian federalism highlights precisely the difficulties of reconciling local autonomy with federal authority. A study of federalism and relations between the centre and regions in Ethiopia describes these long-standing tensions.
Pretoria halted the war, but did not resolve its causes
On 2 November 2022, the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in Pretoria. Negotiated under the auspices of the African Union, the text brought large-scale fighting in the north of the country to an end. It provided, in particular, for disarmament, the restoration of services and humanitarian access.
Four years later, the agreement remains a major milestone, but its implementation is still contested. The return of displaced people, the administration of disputed territories and Tigray’s political reintegration remain sensitive issues. In March 2025, the African Union was still urging the parties to honour their commitments. Its statement on the situation in Tigray underscores that the peace process requires sustained follow-up.
The conflict is not the only domestic challenge. In Amhara, federal forces are fighting Fano militias. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army remains engaged in an insurgency against the state. These conflicts have distinct trajectories and actors; reducing them to a single national divide would obscure the political demands specific to each region.
The population feels the consequences unevenly. Insecurity makes travel, access to services and trade more difficult in affected areas. In Addis Ababa, institutions and major projects remain the most visible face of the state; in affected regions, the priorities may be day-to-day security, the return of public services and the ability to take part in local decision-making.
The Red Sea: a strategic issue and a source of tension
Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea gained independence in 1993. It relies heavily on neighbouring ports, particularly Djibouti, for its foreign trade. Abiy Ahmed presents access to the sea as a strategic issue for a country with a large population and growing economic importance.
But this objective runs up against the sovereignty of neighbouring states and revives a regional memory marked by war. In 2024, an announced agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland on access to the sea triggered a crisis with Somalia, which considers the territory part of its state. Relations with Eritrea have also deteriorated since their rapprochement in 2018 and their cooperation during the Tigray war.
In autumn 2026, renewed fighting in Tigray and tensions over the Red Sea are fuelling fears of a wider conflagration. Information about responsibility and casualty figures must nevertheless be attributed with caution. The Associated Press reports that the Pretoria agreement is under increased pressure and that maritime ambitions are becoming entangled with regional rivalries. Its overview of the conflicts and Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions places these tensions in the context of the Horn of Africa’s wider dynamics.
A stronger mandate, but legitimacy still debated
The legislative election on 1 June 2026 consolidated the Prosperity Party’s position. According to results announced by the National Election Board, it won 438 of the 501 seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives. The Ethiopian state news agency also reported the victory. The election results announced in Ethiopia convey the scale of the majority secured.
This parliamentary victory does not close the debate about representativeness. Polling stations did not open in some areas affected by insecurity, while opponents contested the conditions of the vote. For the government, the result strengthens its mandate; for its critics, it does not address questions of inclusion and pluralism, especially as several regions remain in conflict.
Ethiopia’s trajectory affects the whole Horn of Africa. The country is home to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and plays a central role in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional cooperation organisation. A renewed war could affect trade, population movements and the security of neighbouring countries, while the region is already facing several crises.
Abiy Ahmed’s project therefore combines national unity, political centralisation and strategic assertion. Its durability will depend less on stated ambitions than on the ability to negotiate the sharing of power, implement the Pretoria agreement and address conflicts region by region. This is where the possibility of an Ethiopian political compromise will be decided, beyond the electoral mandate.



