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Ethiopia’s rival groups unite, testing Tigray peace and raising risk of regional escalation

Seven armed movements with divergent interests have joined forces against the Ethiopian government. Renewed fighting in Tigray is undermining the Pretoria Agreement and fuelling fears that the crisis could spread to Eritrea.

Ethiopian travellers board a bus at the bus station in Mekele, in the Tigray region.

In Ethiopia, an alliance can bring former adversaries together without erasing the conflicts between them. That is the gamble of seven armed movements challenging federal rule. But renewed fighting in the north has already shown the price civilians could pay if this pact turns into a protracted war.

A peace deal undermined by unresolved tensions

The crisis is unfolding in a federation where regions have significant powers, but disputes over territory, political representation and control of the armed forces remain fierce. Tigray, Amhara and Oromia have all seen clashes with the federal authorities in recent years. Local tensions therefore cannot be reduced to a confrontation between the government and a united rebel bloc.

In Tigray, the 2020–2022 war ended with the Pretoria Agreement, concluded under the auspices of the African Union on 2 November 2022. The deal ended large-scale fighting between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), but its implementation has remained contested. The return of displaced people, restoration of services and status of disputed territories remain sensitive issues. The AU has called on the parties to respect the agreement during previous periods of tension. The African Union statement on the situation in Tigray recalls the framework for the cessation of hostilities.

In Amhara, Fano fighters, who fought alongside federal forces during the Tigray war, later turned against Addis Ababa. In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is pursuing its own conflict with the state. These movements have distinct regional bases, histories and demands. Their shared opposition to the government is not enough to establish that they have a detailed political programme in common.

Seven groups, one shared goal but different interests

On 20 September 2026, seven organisations announced the creation of the Alliance of Ethiopian Popular Forces for Survival. They include the TPLF, Fano, the OLA and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), as well as Afar, Benishangul and Gumuz movements. The alliance says it wants to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and establish a transitional administration. The announcement was reported by the Associated Press and European outlet Euronews. The report on the alliance’s announcement details its seven members.

The TPLF is a central player in the north. It dominated Ethiopia’s ruling coalition from 1991 to 2018, before Abiy Ahmed came to power. Its political and military experience gives it particular weight, but its rapprochement with Fano is striking: the latter fought against it during the Tigray war. Their current understanding appears to be based first and foremost on a common adversary. It resolves neither the dispute over contested territories nor disagreements about their visions for federal government.

The other members are no more a unified front. The OLA and ONLF defend interests linked to their respective regions. For smaller movements, joining the coalition may raise their profile without guaranteeing that they have military capabilities comparable to those of the main groups. Nor do available reports independently confirm all claims about their operational co-ordination.

Fighting resumes, amid claims that need attribution

Clashes resumed in the north from 22 September, according to reports by several media outlets. The federal government and the TPLF accused each other of reigniting hostilities. On 24 September, the Associated Press described the renewed fighting as putting the Pretoria Agreement at risk. Its report on the renewed clashes highlights the conflicting accounts given by the parties.

The situation has since evolved rapidly. Government-linked fighters entered Mekele, the regional capital, on 4 October after the TPLF forces announced their withdrawal. According to another Associated Press report, Tigrayan forces then left the city, while federal police officers called on residents to help restore order. This sequence alone does not make it possible to conclude that control of the region has stabilised. The latest reports from Mekele describe a situation still in flux.

Eritrean soldiers also reportedly entered towns in Tigray on 8 October, according to commanders cited in the press and residents’ accounts. These reports are sensitive and must remain attributed: the available information does not establish their precise military significance. On 10 October, Addis Ababa told the United Nations it was acting in self-defence against Eritrea, a sign that the dispute now extends beyond Ethiopia’s front lines. The report on troop movements said to have been observed near the border and Ethiopia’s statement to the United Nations document these developments.

Regional risks and the cost to communities

Ethiopia’s relationship with Eritrea looms large over the crisis. The two countries moved closer in 2018, but their relations have since deteriorated. Debate over Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea and the port of Assab is fuelling tensions: Ethiopia is landlocked, while Eritrea controls its coastline. A confrontation between their forces could therefore widen the crisis beyond Tigray.

At regional level, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brings together several countries in the Horn of Africa. An escalation involving Eritrea would affect a region already marked by border crises and displacement. The African Union, whose headquarters are in Addis Ababa, is also concerned: a lasting failure of the agreement it helped broker would weigh on its ability to support peace processes across the continent.

For residents, the consequences are measured not only by changes in control of towns. Fighting can disrupt travel, access to healthcare and schools, and the trade on which local markets depend. Displaced households and rural communities far from urban centres are particularly exposed when roads become dangerous or services stop functioning. In Mekele, the arrival of government forces does not automatically mean a return to safety; in disputed areas, uncertainty can deter families from coming home.

The main test in the coming weeks will therefore be twofold: to establish whether the armed movements are genuinely co-ordinating their actions beyond their declaration, and to determine whether the Pretoria Agreement can still provide a basis for de-escalation. Addis Ababa must contain several fronts without opening a conflict with Asmara. For the alliance’s groups, the question is whether they can turn an alliance of convenience into a credible political proposition. For civilians, the immediate priorities remain protection and continuity of services, as regional authorities, IGAD and the African Union seek to prevent the crisis from spreading.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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