In Addis Ababa, Abiy Ahmed’s new term begins under dual pressure. The government has a very large parliamentary majority, but must contain renewed fighting in the north and limit the social impact of economic reforms.
A government returned to office with a considerable parliamentary majority
On 5 October 2026, the House of Peoples’ Representatives appointed Abiy Ahmed prime minister for a second term. The Ethiopian head of government then swore an oath before President Taye Atske-Selassie at the opening of the seventh legislature.
His return to office follows the general election of 1 June 2026. According to results announced by the National Election Board, the Prosperity Party won 438 of the 486 seats allocated in the House. This majority gives the government the institutional means to implement its programme over the next five years.
It does not, however, resolve the country’s political tensions. The election took place amid insecurity that prevented or disrupted voting in some areas. The ruling party’s parliamentary dominance therefore strengthens the executive without putting an end to regional disputes or demands from parts of the opposition.
The government’s programme focuses on productivity, investment, employment and improved public services. Its implementation will nevertheless depend on Addis Ababa’s ability to stabilise conflict-affected regions. Without lasting security, infrastructure, agriculture and trade remain vulnerable.
A dynamic economy, but uneven gains
Ethiopia continues to record strong growth. The International Monetary Fund forecasts real gross domestic product growth of 9.2 % for the 2025/2026 financial year. It expects growth to slow to 7.8 % in 2026/2027, partly as a result of external pressures and financial imbalances.
Several sectors underpin this activity. Agriculture, irrigated crops, mining and electricity generation support the economy. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the large dam built on the Blue Nile, is also helping to increase electricity supply and strengthen the country’s productive capacity.
National growth does not automatically translate into an improved daily life. The IMF forecasts inflation of close to 14 % at the end of the 2025/2026 financial year, followed by a gradual decline. Rising prices directly affect households, particularly through the cost of food, transport and household fuels.
Since July 2024, the authorities have introduced a package of reforms. The birr is now more responsive to the foreign exchange market, and monetary policy relies more heavily on interest rates. These measures are intended to reduce foreign currency shortages and correct long-standing imbalances. In the short term, however, they make some imported goods more expensive and complicate business management.
The main challenge will therefore be to turn macroeconomic growth into more regular incomes. In Ethiopia, about 70 % of the working population still depends on agriculture. Creating jobs in industry, services and agro-processing will be crucial to reducing household vulnerability.
The World Bank estimated that poverty rose from 27 % to 32 % between 2016 and 2021, amid conflict, inflation and economic shocks. These figures do not describe the current trajectory, but they show the scale of the social challenge. Reforms will have to produce visible results beyond financial indicators.
Renewed fighting undermines stability in the north
The economic priority is being challenged by a fresh deterioration in security. Clashes resumed from 22 September 2026 in northern Ethiopia, particularly in Tigray and the Afar region. The fighting later spread to Amhara, according to information gathered by conflict monitors and several international media outlets.
The return of hostilities calls the Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022, into question. The agreement had ended two years of war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF, at enormous human and material cost.
Tigrayan forces took control of several positions, including Mekele airport, before forces allied with the federal government returned to the regional capital. Military movements have also affected flights to Mekele, Aksum and Shire. For residents, these disruptions restrict access to healthcare, markets and family travel.
The federal government and the TPLF offer differing accounts of what triggered the escalation. The former accuses its adversaries of threatening the country’s territorial integrity. The latter says it is acting against what it describes as military and political threats. These competing claims should be treated with caution, as independent access to the combat zones remains limited.
The situation is also affecting neighbouring regions. Afar is an important corridor between northern Ethiopia and Djibouti. Amhara, meanwhile, plays a strategic role in land communications and the country’s internal balance of power. Any spread of the conflict could therefore disrupt trade, harvests and aid deliveries.
Relations with Eritrea become a regional risk
The domestic crisis is accompanied by acute tension with Eritrea. On 1 October, Addis Ababa closed its embassy in Asmara and declared ten Eritrean diplomats persona non grata, meaning unwelcome on its territory. They were ordered to leave Ethiopia within 48 hours.
Asmara subsequently announced the severing of diplomatic relations. The Ethiopian authorities accuse Eritrea of indirectly supporting groups hostile to the federal government. Eritrea rejects the accusations. The past presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray during the 2020–2022 war nevertheless continues to fuel mistrust between the two capitals.
The question of access to the sea adds a strategic dimension to the dispute. Landlocked Ethiopia depends mainly on neighbouring ports for its foreign trade. Its demands for sovereign access to a Red Sea port, particularly around Assab, alarm Eritrea and heighten tensions in the Horn of Africa.
A test for IGAD and the African Union
The latest developments in Ethiopia extend beyond its borders. Ethiopia is a central player in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which brings together several countries in the Horn of Africa. A new war in Tigray could undermine regional mediation efforts, at a time when Sudan and Somalia are already facing serious security crises.
For the African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, the challenge will be to uphold the principle of resolving African conflicts through political means. Abiy Ahmed’s next term will therefore be judged on several fronts at once: consolidating peace in the north, relations with Eritrea, controlling inflation and creating jobs.
The parliamentary majority gives the prime minister rare institutional stability in such a tense period. It also increases his responsibility. The coming months will show whether this political strength enables negotiations to begin or accompanies a further centralisation of power, with direct consequences for Ethiopia’s regions and population.



