A coalition forged on troubled ground
In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s federal government faces a threat more complex than a single rebellion. In the north and west of the country, armed groups that have fought one another in the past now say they are seeking common ground against the centre. This development speaks not only to the balance of power. Above all, it is a reminder that peace in Ethiopia still depends on fragile regional balances, shifting alliances and political dialogue that has never entirely closed the door to armed conflict.
The context is fraught. The cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on 2 November 2022 by the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was presented by the African Union as a major step towards silencing the guns in Tigray. But the agreement did not resolve territorial disputes, political rivalries or security tensions in Amhara, Oromia and the north of the country.
What the armed groups say
On 20 September, a TPLF official told AFP that seven armed groups had formed an alliance aimed at overthrowing the federal government and opening a transition phase. The names mentioned in public discussions include the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army, as well as other organisations active in the east and west of the country. This arrangement remains politically fluid, however. On 17 September, the OLA said it was not formally part of the alliance, while acknowledging that broader cooperation among opposition forces was taking shape.
The TPLF and Fano have different histories, but share a strategy of putting pressure on Addis Ababa. The former comes from Ethiopia’s former centre of power. The latter has emerged in Amhara as a local guerrilla force against the federal army. The OLA, for its part, is part of a longstanding rebellion in Oromia, the country’s most populous region. The rapprochement between these actors does not mean their objectives are the same. Rather, it shows that some of the armed opposition believes the balance of power has shifted once again.
Separate fronts, a shared centre of gravity
Since 2023, federal forces have been fighting Fano in Amhara. In Oromia, the OLA is waging a longstanding insurgency. In Tigray, the 2020-2022 war left behind military structures, political divisions and unresolved territorial claims. It is precisely this overlapping of conflicts that is worrying Addis Ababa. Even imperfect coordination between these groups would force the Ethiopian army to spread its resources across several theatres, rather than concentrate its operations on a single front.
The risk is not only military. It is institutional, too. In Ethiopia, relations between the central government and the regions remain shaped by the centralisation of political debate, competition over territory and the sensitive question of regional autonomy. In this context, an armed alliance between movements from several regions is about more than strategy. It also reflects the at least partial failure of mechanisms that could contain conflicts before they become militarised again.
For civilians, the immediate consequences are familiar. Any escalation in tensions exposes families to displacement, movement restrictions, forced recruitment and the collapse of already fragile services. Tigray paid an immense human and material price during the 2020-2022 war. In Amhara and Oromia, the fighting has also taken a toll on the local economy, markets, roads and harvests. Rural areas, small towns and trade corridors are often the first to bear the shock, long before the political rhetoric.
What this latest development says about Ethiopia and the region
The current developments extend beyond Ethiopia itself. A pivotal country in the Horn of Africa and a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ethiopia has a bearing on the security balance in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and the Red Sea. When Addis Ababa falters, the repercussions cross its borders: arms flows, population displacement, diplomatic pressure and strained relations with neighbouring countries almost always follow.
This crisis must also be viewed on a continental scale. The African Union, which led the Pretoria mediation, remains a key player in ensuring that the Ethiopia issue is not addressed solely through a security lens. The challenge now is not only to preserve an agreement signed in 2022. It is to determine whether the Ethiopian state can still rebuild a political framework capable of preventing fragmented armed coalitions from permanently replacing institutional debate. The stability of Addis Ababa, and of the entire Horn of Africa, is at stake.



