When kidnapping becomes an economy
In Nigeria, fear no longer ends when people are released. It follows them into markets, schools, bus stations and villages in the north. Above all, it lingers in families’ finances, because every abduction leaves behind one simple, brutal question: who will pay, and how much?
This reality grew even more serious between July 2025 and June 2026. According to a study by SBM Intelligence, criminal and armed groups received 7.78 billion naira, or about $5.8 million, in ransom payments. A year earlier, the recorded amount stood at 2.56 billion naira. The increase is clear: the figure more than tripled.
A country under multiple security pressures
Nigeria is facing several centres of violence at once. In the north-east, the jihadist insurgency waged for more than a decade by Boko Haram and its splinter group, Islamic State West Africa Province, remains active. In the north-west and north-central regions, armed groups, often locally known as bandits, are carrying out more and more kidnappings for ransom. Further south-east, separatist tensions add to the security challenge.
This security puzzle goes beyond law and order. It affects schools, roads, farming and informal trade. It also puts the authority of the federal state under pressure, with its ability to protect Nigerians regularly put to the test, as Bola Tinubu’s administration pledges from Abuja to strengthen its response to terrorism and banditry.
The figures behind a clandestine market
The SBM Intelligence report records at least 7,825 people kidnapped during the period under review, a 66% increase in one year. It also reports at least 1,142 deaths, including 895 civilians. These figures should be treated with caution, as many families do not report payments, sometimes for fear of reprisals and sometimes because the process remains opaque.
The north-west remains the epicentre of the phenomenon. There, attacks by armed groups overlap with older land conflicts between farmers and herders, the weak presence of the state in some rural areas and the growth of criminal networks involved in everything from looting and extortion to kidnapping. Reuters and the Associated Press have regularly described the region as a place where kidnappings have become common practice for armed gangs.
The report also highlights a major shift: 80% of those kidnapped were taken in mass abductions. In other words, mass kidnapping is no longer the exception. It has become an operating method. That changes everything. A single coordinated attack on a road, village, school or place of worship is enough to heighten social pressure and accelerate payments.
Boko Haram takes most of the ransom proceeds
The report’s most striking finding is the concentration of proceeds. Two mass kidnappings attributed to Boko Haram are said to account for nearly 7 billion naira, or about 90% of the total recorded. The first involved more than 400 people abducted in Ngoshe, Borno State. The second targeted about 300 pupils and staff at St Mary’s Catholic School in Niger State, in the north-central region.
This concentration reveals much about the logic of armed groups. Kidnappings are no longer just a means of spreading terror. They finance weapons, movements, supply networks and, at times, local complicity. Economic motives now sit alongside military ones. This is also highlighted by the Nigeria Security Database and, more broadly, by analyses of insurgency financing in the Lake Chad region.
The issue is sensitive, as Nigerian authorities do not always acknowledge the payment of ransoms. Yet a 2022 law criminalised ransom payments, specifically to cut off kidnappers’ resources. On the ground, families often continue to give in for lack of a credible alternative. The law is there. Protection remains uneven.
What this means for families, the economy and politics
For households, the impact is immediate. A ransom can wipe out years of savings, force the sale of land, interrupt schooling or push a small business into debt. For traders and transport operators, fear drives up costs. For schools, it fuels absenteeism. In rural areas, it accelerates displacement. In cities, it raises the cost of private security and makes travel to outlying areas less safe.
The political impact is just as significant. Security and the economy will be among the main issues in the 2027 electoral cycle, whose timetable has been set by the Independent National Electoral Commission. The presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for 16 January 2027, according to the commission’s website, while the official timetable sets out the rest of the electoral calendar. In this context, every mass kidnapping also becomes a test of credibility for the federal state, based in Abuja.
President Tinubu has recently highlighted rescue operations and pledged a tougher response. But the challenge goes beyond communications. It requires better control of forest hideouts, disruption of financial networks, stronger local intelligence and protection of major roads. Without that, kidnapping will remain a profitable crime.
A warning for West Africa
Nigeria is not alone in facing this kind of predation. In a West Africa already criss-crossed by the movement of weapons, fighters and criminal capital, the rise in kidnappings could inspire other groups and fuel armed survival economies across borders. ECOWAS, which is monitoring regional security closely, knows that porous border areas complicate any response confined to national borders.
The wider implications are clear. Nigeria’s experience shows how local insecurity can become a sustainable funding system, capable of sustaining an insurgency, wearing down communities and eroding trust in institutions. The next key test is clear: whether Abuja can turn security pledges into measurable results before the 2027 political cycle begins.



