When strategic metals move from the margins back to centre stage
The question is no longer whether rare earths matter. It is who will control their extraction, processing and the value that flows from them. For several African countries, this market is not just a mining issue: it is a test of industrial sovereignty, at a time when global demand continues to be driven by permanent magnets, electric vehicles, wind turbines and some defence applications.
In this context, Africa is back on the radar of international players, but on a still fragile footing. The continent is no longer absent from geological maps or investors’ portfolios. However, it remains behind in the value chain, particularly in refining and separation, where most of the margin is concentrated. This explains the growing interest in projects such as Kangankunde in Malawi, or Songwe Hill, also in this southern African country.
The signal from Balaka, Malawi
In early July 2026, Lindian Resources announced that it had carried out the first mine blast at the Kangankunde site in Malawi’s Balaka district. The company says this step launches extraction operations and keeps it on track for first commercial production in the fourth quarter of 2026. This timetable also appears in a stock exchange announcement dated 2 July 2026.
The Malawian government is closely monitoring the project. In its 2025 annual economic report, the Ministry of Finance says that Lindian Resources was granted a licence to mine rare earths at Kangankunde, and that construction work on the mine was due to begin in the first quarter of 2025. The same document describes Kangankunde as one of the world’s largest rare earth deposits, while highlighting the infrastructure, energy and logistics constraints that continue to weigh on Malawi’s mining sector.
These details matter because Malawi is seeking to use its mineral resources as a macroeconomic lever. The World Bank notes that the country’s mining sector still accounts for less than 1% of GDP and that recent exports remain limited. But it also sees minerals linked to the energy transition, including rare earths, as a potential source of revenue, foreign exchange and higher-skilled jobs.
A highly concentrated, but not static, global market
Rare earths are not rare in geological terms. Their rarity lies above all in the difficulty of producing them profitably. The group comprises 17 elements, including terbium, dysprosium, scandium and yttrium. They have become indispensable to several advanced technologies. Their uses go well beyond smartphones. They are also central to electric motors, wind turbines and some modern military supply chains.
The global market remains dominated by China. According to the USGS, global mine production of rare earths reached 390,000 tonnes of rare-earth oxide equivalent in 2024, compared with 376,000 tonnes in 2023. China produced 270,000 tonnes, far ahead of the United States, at 45,000 tonnes, and Australia, at 13,000 tonnes. The same table then lists Myanmar, India, Nigeria, Russia and Vietnam among the other significant producers.
This dominance does not rule out the emergence of new suppliers. Rather, it shows a still highly concentrated market in which the geography of extraction is changing faster than that of refining. Yet it is this second stage that determines real control of the supply chain. Countries that export concentrates without local separation capacity remain dependent on buyers, prices and industrial decisions made elsewhere.
Africa is advancing, but at different speeds
African mining’s return is therefore not an abstract promise. It is based on a series of identified projects, though they are not all at the same stage. In Malawi, Kangankunde appears to be the most advanced project. Alongside it, the authorities and operators also cite Songwe Hill in the south of the country, as well as other regional projects in Tanzania, Angola and South Africa. The World Bank considers that seven mining projects are under development in Malawi, several of them linked to transition minerals.
Malawi is not alone. In southern Africa, several states are seeking to capture more value from strategic minerals. Tanzania, Angola and South Africa feature in the road maps of potential producers. The strategy is clear: move beyond being simply a site of extraction to become an actor capable of attracting investment, negotiating mining development agreements and, in time, locating more processing domestically.
The social stakes differ from country to country and from one area to another. In capital cities, debate centres on public revenue, foreign exchange and contracts. In mining districts, the issues are chiefly roads, electricity, water, land and local employment. The Malawian ministry’s report stresses these bottlenecks: limited electricity capacity, inadequate roads and railways, high costs and environmental risks. Unless these constraints are addressed, the expansion of mining will remain incomplete.
What this return means beyond Malawi
Africa’s return to the rare earths market is part of a broader contest over critical minerals. Advanced economies are seeking to reduce their dependence on Beijing. Emerging producers, meanwhile, want to turn strategic interest into tangible benefits. This is where the decisive issue lies: not merely extracting, but securing contracts, building plants, training a workforce and ensuring that value does not immediately leave through exports.
For Africa, the window of opportunity is real, but narrow. UNCTAD points out that the continent has a significant geological advantage in several critical minerals and that the real challenge is industrial processing, local integration and economic diversification. In other words, the continent can play a greater role in the rare earths supply chain, provided it does not repeat the old pattern of enclave economies.
Burundi is a reminder that nothing is irreversible. In 2021, the authorities in Bujumbura suspended exports linked to the Gakara project, ending the only industrial-scale production then under way in Africa. The site has remained shut since. This precedent shows that regulatory stability, the sharing of mining revenues and dialogue with the authorities are just as important as underground wealth.
In the coming months, attention will focus above all on the ramp-up at Kangankunde, the financing of other regional projects and the ability of the states concerned to increase local content. If these projects move forward, Africa will be more than just another supplier. It could become a useful and more demanding link in a global supply chain now seeking a new balance beyond China.



