Thursday, November 19, 2026

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Tigray conflict: northern offensive threatens fragile post-war balance

Fighting between federal forces and Tigrayan combatants has spread to Amhara and Afar. The army’s reported death toll remains unverifiable, as the crisis revives tensions left by the 2020–2022 war.

Residents of Mekelle at a bus station, amid everyday urban life in northern Ethiopia

In northern Ethiopia, the front’s rupture is no longer confined to Tigray. Fighting is spreading to Afar and Amhara, two regions that control key road routes to Addis Ababa. The expansion is reviving the risk of a protracted conflict, even though the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 brought the open war in Tigray to an end.

A new flare-up around Tigray

On Thursday 24 September 2026, the Ethiopian army said it had killed 272 fighters linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the armed party that governed the region for several decades. It also reported 260 wounded among its opponents. The figures come from a statement by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and could not be independently verified.

The military statement came after attacks launched, according to federal authorities, in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara. The army says it carried out a counter-offensive. Tigrayan leaders, for their part, accuse the federal government of provoking the escalation and describe the ongoing operations as a response to mounting military pressure.

Clashes have been reported near Yallo, a town in Afar, as well as around Weldiya, in the North Wollo zone of Amhara. The town lies on a route linking the north of the country with the central regions. Its position gives it military and logistical importance, but does not mean that an advance towards Addis Ababa is assured.

Available information remains fragmentary. Communications are difficult in several conflict zones. Armed groups are issuing conflicting casualty figures. Claims about captured towns, soldiers taken prisoner or heavy losses should therefore be treated with caution.

The legacy of the 2020–2022 war

The crisis is part of the continuing fallout from the Tigray war, which began in November 2020 between the federal government and Tigrayan forces. The conflict later spread to Amhara and Afar. The cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on 2 November 2022, brought large-scale fighting to a halt.

However, the agreement did not resolve all territorial and political questions. The status of disputed territories, the return of displaced people, the disarmament of combatants and the reintegration of Tigrayan forces remain sensitive issues. Trust between Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, and Addis Ababa remains limited.

The situation is further complicated by the war being waged against Fano militias in Amhara since 2023. These armed groups, which emerged from the Amhara nationalist movement, opposed the federal government after it proposed integrating regional forces into the national army. In the north, former adversaries may now have converging interests against the central government.

This realignment is one of the most sensitive aspects of the crisis. Tigrayan forces and Fano fighters clashed during the previous war, notably over territories claimed by both communities. Any military rapprochement between them, even a temporary one, could shift the balance in northern Ethiopia.

Mutual accusations and an uncertain toll

Federal authorities describe Tigrayan operations as an offensive against the country’s territorial integrity. The government says it responded to prevent strategic positions in Amhara and Afar from being seized. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Ethiopian President Taye Atske Selassie denounced the “forces of destruction and chaos” as well as interference by foreign actors.

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, for its part, says it has entered an “open war” with federal forces. The wording marks a break with the political framework of the Pretoria Agreement. However, it does not in itself make it possible to assess the scale of the operations or confirm lasting control of a town.

According to reports carried by international media, fighting has also reached the areas around Raya and Alamata, south of Tigray. Local authorities have reported strikes hitting civilian areas. Here, too, death and injury tolls remain to be established by independent sources and humanitarian organisations on the ground.

The first consequences are being felt by residents. In rural areas, clashes can disrupt markets, transport and access to healthcare. People displaced during the previous war remain particularly vulnerable. In towns, movement restrictions and rising prices can affect traders, employees and households dependent on supplies from other regions.

The risk extends beyond the combatants. A resumption of fighting around roads in Amhara and Afar could disrupt the flow of goods to the north. It would also make the delivery of humanitarian aid more difficult. For local authorities, the priority is to keep public services running. For Addis Ababa, it is to secure strategic routes and prevent the formation of a coordinated front against the federal government.

Implications for the Horn of Africa

Instability in Ethiopia extends beyond its borders. Ethiopia plays a central role in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, which brings together several countries in the Horn of Africa. A new war in the north could affect trade corridors, population movements and the balance of relations with Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti.

The crisis is also unfolding in an already fragile regional environment. Neighbouring Sudan has been at war since April 2023. The border between the two countries is home to displaced people and remains exposed to smuggling and land disputes. Any further Ethiopian military mobilisation could therefore affect several borders at once.

For the African Union, based in Addis Ababa, the issue raises a difficult question. The Pretoria Agreement was backed by the continental organisation and African mediators. A resumption of hostilities would test African conflict-prevention mechanisms and the credibility of efforts to monitor the agreement.

The coming steps will be decisive. The reported losses, developments on the front around Weldiya and Yallo, and mediators’ ability to restore channels of dialogue will all need to be verified. For now, the established facts chiefly show that the crisis has spread geographically. They do not yet support the conclusion that there has been a full return to the 2020–2022 war.

The first reports of fighting in northern Ethiopia, the toll announced by the Ethiopian army and available information on the Amhara and Tigray fronts all point to an intensification of the fighting, but do not yet allow the reported death toll to be independently confirmed.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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