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Sudan’s RSF defections expose fractured force and raise impunity concerns

Defections by RSF officers in Sudan expose internal tensions, regional networks and allegations of abuses. The army is using them to weaken its rivals, at the cost of fuelling debate over impunity.

Courtyard of a contemporary Sudanese administrative building in Port Sudan, with anonymous officials and natural light

A war being fought within the ranks, too

In Sudan, front lines are not visible only on maps. They also shift within armed groups, where loyalties fracture, war wounds become a political issue and every defection is presented as a decisive victory. For several months, the Sudanese army has highlighted defections from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as the open war between the two sides, which began on 15 April 2023, continues to ravage the country. In recent months, IGAD and the African Union have reiterated that no lasting solution can come from a simple military victory.

This internal shift says something broader: Sudan’s war is no longer just a confrontation between two military commands, but a struggle to retain the allegiance of men scattered across several theatres, from Darfur to Kordofan and as far as Blue Nile. In this context, defections carry significance beyond their numbers alone. They raise questions about the RSF’s cohesion, the role of field commanders and the command’s ability to hold together an organisation built on tribal alliances, money networks and external support.

What the defections reveal

On 19 August 2026, General Moussa Ali Ahmad, known as Moussa Khamsine, joined the army’s side with more than 300 fighters and several dozen armed vehicles. On 20 August, the army confirmed that it had completed the first phase of integrating these defectors. Another officer who switched to the army, General al-Nour al-Qobba, had made the same move several months earlier. The military authorities see this as proof of the RSF’s gradual erosion. Critics, however, point out that switching sides does not erase past responsibility.

These departures involve more than fighters. They also affect the paramilitaries’ political sphere. Officials linked to the parallel administration set up by the RSF have stepped down in recent months, at a time when the movement’s internal balance appears more fragile. This withdrawal comes as the war has already caused immense suffering in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, and in other besieged cities. Attacks on civilians, summary executions and forced displacement have been documented by the UN and several human rights organisations.

Defectors’ accounts should be treated with caution. They speak at a time when they are seeking to persuade their new side of their usefulness. But several details are corroborated. Recent reports describe arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and ransom demands at detention sites controlled by the RSF in Nyala, in South Darfur. Sudanese organisations, the UN and Sudanese doctors have reported deaths in custody and extreme conditions. The Dagris centre in Nyala is often mentioned in these documents as overcrowded, opaque and feared.

The weight of regional networks

Sudan’s war extends beyond the country’s borders. Sudan is part of the IGAD region, and in February 2026 the organisation reaffirmed its commitment to supporting a way out of the crisis. It also falls within the African Union’s sphere of action; on 22 June 2026, the AU called for the country’s unity and territorial integrity to be preserved. In this crisis, neighbouring countries matter as much as the warring parties. Chad, Ethiopia, Libya and South Sudan are regularly mentioned in accounts of the movement of fighters, equipment or medical care. The countries concerned dispute these allegations, but they show how far Sudan’s war has become regionalised.

This regionalisation has a direct consequence: it blurs the line between an internal war and a cross-border alliance game. Accounts from defectors refer to logistical routes through Chad and Ethiopia, as well as technical support that allegedly facilitated some offensives in Blue Nile. None of this should be treated as conclusive proof. But taken together, the accounts describe a conflict in which border areas serve as corridors, refuges or rear bases. At this point, Sudan is facing more than a war of positions. It is also facing a war of movement.

The other issue is justice. In June 2026, Human Rights Watch called for RSF commanders who had switched to the army not to be automatically covered by an amnesty. The organisation argues that no military rationale can justify forgetting serious crimes. This is a central issue for Sudan, where impunity has fuelled several cycles of violence over the decades. For civilians, the question is therefore not only which side wins. It is whether those responsible for atrocities will ever be prosecuted, whatever uniform they wear afterwards.

At the continental level, the case of Sudan is a reminder of a reality all too familiar in Africa: when a war drags on, it weakens the state, displaces populations, reorganises armed networks and eventually affects neighbouring countries. Defections within the RSF could accelerate this shift without guaranteeing a way out of the crisis. The next point to watch, then, is less a dramatic gesture than what follows: the state of the fronts at El Fasher, in Kordofan and in Blue Nile; the army’s ability to integrate its new recruits; and whether African mediators can reopen a credible political space around Khartoum.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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