A pressured shipping route, and players adept at finding ways around it
Between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, every container, dhow and stop at a quay can become a security concern. In this area, smuggling networks no longer serve merely to move prohibited goods; they also link armed groups, diasporas, ports and migration routes crossing the Horn of Africa. A new report by The Century Foundation describes the growing influence of Yemen’s Houthis on the African shore of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea and, further west, Sudan meet.
The central point is straightforward: an armed group that controls part of north-western Yemen is no longer simply seeking to survive. It is seeking to endure, diversify its supply lines and establish itself in a regional space where maritime borders remain porous. The report shows that this strategy relies on commercial links, local intermediaries and opportunistic ties with other armed actors. This is therefore not an isolated episode, but a network embedded in the long-established grey economy around the Red Sea.
The Horn of Africa, a commercial crossroads and a theatre for manoeuvre
Djibouti occupies a particular place in this set-up. The country lies at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and its port serves as a transshipment hub for regional and international trade. The report notes that this volume of traffic makes it harder to intercept suspicious cargoes. Other public sources confirm Djibouti’s logistical importance: the World Bank describes it as a well-positioned transshipment hub on one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, while the International Monetary Fund says traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remains significantly disrupted since the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Somalia, meanwhile, remains a space of movement and fragmentation. The European Union Agency for Asylum says that in 2026 Al-Shabaab still controlled large rural areas and many localities, with estimates of around 30% of the territory, illustrating the difficulty of securing the coastline and inland routes. In this landscape, trafficking networks linking the Somali coast to Yemen are nothing new. They rely on routes already used for weapons, migrants and various smuggled goods.
What the report says about the Houthis, Djibouti and Somalia
The document, published on 24 August 2026, argues that the Houthis have developed contacts in Somalia that go beyond simple arms smuggling. They are also said to be seeking links with Al-Shabaab, in a form of exchange of services: supplies, training, logistics and intelligence in return for help facilitating movements in the Gulf of Aden. The report cites the case of a Somali intermediary arrested in Mukalla, in southern Yemen, who allegedly facilitated the journey of several hundred Somalis to Houthi training camps in 2024. This should be read as a claim attributed to the report, not as a fact established by an independent court.
In Djibouti, the mechanism is said to be different but just as revealing. The report describes the establishment, from around 2022, of a smuggling cell using front companies, commercial containers and dhows to reship components and materials to Yemen in an effort to circumvent the arms embargo. Djibouti’s importance lies in its status as a port hub: the heavier the legitimate traffic, the more easily suspicious cargoes can blend into the flow. It is precisely this mix of legal trade and clandestine routes that makes the area so difficult to monitor.
The report also says the Houthis are seeking to establish a foothold in Sudan and Eritrea. Caution is warranted on this point. Available public sources confirm an environment conducive to cross-border connections in the Red Sea, but do not always make it possible to establish the depth or durability of these ties. In Eritrea, the report refers to possible efforts to revive networks, without providing definitive open-source evidence for all the links mentioned. In other words, the hypothesis exists, but the level of certainty varies from one theatre to another.
Why this development matters to the region
For Horn of Africa states, the issue is not only security-related. It is also economic. When a strait such as Bab el-Mandeb becomes unstable, transport costs rise, insurers reassess risks, and transit ports must contend with tighter checks without slowing the movement of essential goods. In 2026, the IMF said maritime passages through the strait had not returned to their 2023 levels, showing that a security shock can persist long after the initial attacks.
For Djibouti, the challenge is twofold. The country derives much of its strategic value from its role as a transit hub, particularly for landlocked Ethiopia. But this position can also attract trafficking networks that take advantage of the high volume of logistical activity. For Somalia, the impact is more diffuse, as institutional fragility, local conflicts and Al-Shabaab’s continued presence leave room for alliances of convenience. In both cases, the effects are felt first by coastal communities, transporters, informal traders and young people exposed to opportunistic recruitment.
The report also points to a broader reality: the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa do not form a theatre separate from the rest of the continent. They are a corridor linking maritime security, migration routes, regional rivalries and internal conflicts. The Houthis are now seeking strategic depth there. East Africa, meanwhile, must manage the effects of a game that extends well beyond Yemen alone. This issue should therefore be monitored by the African Union, IGAD, port authorities and maritime surveillance services, because the next shift may not come from a single front, but from a chain of small links already in place.



